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LETHAL PASSAGE: HOW THE TRAVELS OF A SINGLE HANDGUN EXPOSE
THE ROOTS OF AMERICA'S GUN CRISIS. By Erik Larson. New York:
Crown Publishers. 1994. 272 pp. $21.00.
"If guns are outlawed, only outlaws will have guns."
This enigmatic statement, popularized during the 1960s, came to
symbolize America's love/hate relationship with guns. Those in favor of
strict laws regulating weapon sale and use interpreted the statement to
mean that criminals would be easier to identify and punish if guns were
illegal. Those in the pro-gun lobby, mainly disciples of the National Rifle
Association (NRA), argued that outlawing guns would leave law abiding
citizens defenseless against those who chQse to violate the law.
Meanwhile, America's courts, as well as its governing bodies, have shown
equal ambivalence and confusion over the subject of gun control.
In his book, Lethal Passage, Erik Larson joins the debate by tracing
a Cobray M-11/9 semiautomatic handgun from its manufacturer, to its
distributor, to its eventual sale to a troubled teenager in Virginia. The
teenager eventually took the handgun to school to avenge a perceived
slight by a classmate and ended up killing one teacher and wounding
several other teachers and students during an uncontrollable shooting
spree. Interwoven throughout this chilling tale is a detailed and well-
balanced analysis of how America, through its history, politics, and
culture, has reached the present point of handgun crisis.'
The story of sixteen year old Nicholas Eliot, who brought a
semiautomatic handgun and several hundred rounds of ammunition to the
Atlantic Shores Christian School in Virginia Beach and fired into
* Professor of Law and Library Director, New York Law School, A.B. 1969, M.L.S.
1970, University of California, Berkeley; J.D. 1976, Golden Gate University School of
Law. I would like to thank Professor David Chang, Camille Broussard, Esq., D.
Bernadette Parker and Dr. Alex Avdeef for their help in the preparation of this book
review.
1. ERIK LARSON, LETHAL PASSAGE 17 (1994).
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classrooms, was barely reported outside the local press. The American
media and general public have long become accustomed to stories of mass
shootings and gun violence. Yet it was exactly this sense of normalcy and
non-controversy that Mr. Larson chose to explore. How did a teenager
come to possess such a dangerous weapon as well as so much
ammunition? Since the Kempville Road District of Virginia Beach is
hardly the inner-city ghetto from which such stories usually seem to
emerge, are such weapons readily available on the open market? If so,
why? And, finally, what can be done to ensure that such stories are not
repeated?
While Mr. Larson uses the incident of Nicholas Eliot and his shooting
spree to provide a framework for his narrative, the true "star" of the book
is the Cobray pistol, and all other guns like it that have no other reason
to exist except to shoot (and presumably kill) human beings. Mr. Larson
shows how the Cobray, a lightweight, "consumer" pistol evolved from its
first incarnation as a cheap version of a machine gun for use by Latin
American guerrillas in the 1960s. These first weapons, called M10s, were
manufactured illegally in the United States, but had the tacit approval of
the U.S. government because of possible applications by the military. The
manufacturing of these guns remained in the hands of private individuals,
mostly soldier of fortune types, who began advertising in various gun
collectors' magazines, as well as offering a fully automatic version to
governments around the world.
A lightweight, semiautomatic version, now called the Ingram M10,
gained a certain amount of fame after being featured in the 1974 John
Wayne movie "McQ." This movie showed the gun to be silent, easy to
carry, and rapid-qualities that certain members of the consuming public
found attractive. What made this gun particularly popular was its internal
design that allowed the semiautomatic weapon to be easily converted to
fully automatic fire. Even a reader with no particular interest in the
mechanics of guns or their design will be fascinated by this tale of the
conversion of a military machine gun into a consumer-friendly, popular
home item with such marketable names as "Street Sweeper" and "Ladies
Home Companion."
Throughout his description of the emergence of the Cobray as a mass
market weapon, however, Mr. Larson continuously reminds the reader
that many gun experts agree that the Cobray serves no useful purpose
because it is neither a hunting gun nor can it be used for target shooting.
Although the gun is lightweight, it still needs two hands to hold and shoot
2. Id. at 59.
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and it is too heavy to sight. Thus, the main question remains, "Why is
a gun like this readily available and why do many Americans want (or feel
they need) to own one?"
After discussing the evolution of the Cobray, Mr. Larson then turns
to the mechanics of gun distribution and sale. Gun dealers are required
by law to be licensed and to comply with a multitude of regulations that
govern the way they do business. In spite of this, or perhaps because of
it, Larson believes, "[t]o be a gun dealer in America is to occupy a
strange and dangerous outpost on the moral frontier." 4
Nicholas bought the Cobray at Guns Unlimited, a legitimate gun shop
that considered itself to be a "good dealer." 5 As a minor, Nicholas was
barred by federal law from buying a handgun, but the actual purchase of
the gun was made by Nicholas' adult second cousin Curtis Williams when
Nicholas was fifteen. Such "straw-man" purchases, "in which a qualified
buyer buys a handgun for an unqualified person, are the primary means
by which America's bad guys acquire their weapons." 6 What would
possess an adult to arrange for a fifteen year old to get a semiautomatic
weapon? Williams later stated that he knew a lot of people who had
bought guns for juveniles; he did not see anything wrong with it and he
did not know of any law against buying a gun for a juvenile.'
Immediately after the school shootings, federal agents arrested Williams
and charged him with making a straw-man purchase. He was tried and
served thirteen months in prison. Nicholas obtained his arsenal of bullets
in an equally straightforward way-his mother bought them for him after
he said he needed them for target shooting.
While the actions of Nicholas' cousin and mother can perhaps be
explained as mere misguided helpfulness, Mr. Larson is much more
critical when discussing the role of Guns Unlimited, and all other gun
stores, in handgun sales. At a negligence trial brought by one of the
survivors of the shooting, it was established that the store clerk had dealt
with Nicholas, an obvious minor, throughout the entire transaction and that
Nicholas had handed the purchase money to Williams, who then handed
it to the clerk. Mr. Larson discloses that gun dealers regularly look the
other way when potential purchasers are underage, intoxicated, or
3. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-930 (1988).
4. LAR SON, supra note 1, at 87.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 88.
7. Id. at 92.
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behaving suspiciously; 8 all reasons that would disqualify a buyer under
federal law. 9 Moreover, federal law imposes upon the dealer or seller the
burden of determining who is a qualified buyer. Thus, one can imagine
that a truly scrupulous dealer would not be in business very long, since
"[e]very storefront gun dealer winds up at some point in his career selling
weapons to killers, drug addicts, psychos, and felons." 10
Further complicating the dealers' role are the various federal
regulations concerning licensing firearm sellers. An uninformed layperson
probably believes that firearm dealing is a highly regulated business and
that weapon sales most likely involve a large amount of paperwork that is
scrutinized closely by federal officials. Mr. Larson shows that the reality
is quite different. In 1992, there were approximately 245,000 licensed
firearms dealers in the United States. 1 In Virginia, general businesses,
such as restaurants, barbershops, shoe stores, and video shops, were also
quite commonly licensed gun dealers. As for the paperwork required,
while it is true that everyone who buys a gun from a federally licensed
firearms dealer must fill out the two page Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms (ATF) Form 4473, which among other things asks the would-be
purchaser if he/she is a drug addict, convicted felon, mentally ill, or an
illegal alien, the form goes nowhere. It is kept in the dealer's files (if,
indeed, the dealer has files) for later reference should the gun be used in
a crime and subsequently traced.12 Mr. Larson does point out that certain
types of purchases, such as buying more than one gun within five working
days, do require paperwork to be sent to the ATF. However, such
notification takes place only after the sale has taken place, which gives the
buyer plenty of time to resell the multiple purchases. Furthermore, since
the notification need only be by mail, rather than fax or some form of
electronic communication, the time delay between suspicious purchase and
investigation is even more acute. 13
Mr. Larson poses the question of whether gun dealers should be doing
more than the law requires to control gun purchases, but he sees little hope
in that ever happening. On the one hand, he recognizes the validity of the
argument that it would be unfair to ask America's gun dealers, who after
all are profit-oriented businessmen, to go beyond what the law requires of
8. Id. at 87.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1988).
10. LARSON, supra note 1, at 87.
11. Id. at 97.
12. Id. at 94.
13. Id. at 104.
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them. On the other hand, he illustrates that these same businessmen,
along with the NRA and other gun lobbyists, have "played a large role in
shaping the very laws that now allow gun dealers to disregard whatever
qualms they may feel about selling guns to particular individuals."' 4 Thus,
it is unrealistic to expect dealers to volunteer to comply with more
stringent requirements when they have opposed making those requirements
mandatory.
What of the government agency that is entrusted with enforcing the
federal laws that do exist? Mr. Larson analogizes the relationship of the
ATF to America's gun dealers as that of indulgent parent to wayward
child. 5 As depicted by Mr. Larson, the ATF is an agency under siege,
attacked by the NRA for trampling on the constitutional rights of law-
abiding citizens, while at the same time criticized by anti-gun forces for
not being aggressive enough in preventing gun trafficking. Chronically
understaffed, the agency has only 400 inspectors, who must also police the
nation's breweries, liquor distributors and tobacco producers. Licensing
requirements for federal firearms dealers are so lenient that practically
every applicant who applies receives a license, as long as the applicant
pays a thirty dollar license fee. In 1990, the ATF turned down only
seventy out of 34,336 applicants.' 6 Thus, the number of individuals to be
regulated increases annually, while the number of regulators remains
static. The combination of lax federal laws and agency understaffmg has
led to a proliferation of shadow gun dealers who are not required to
conduct legitimate businesses and advertise, but, instead, sell guns out of
homes and offices whenever and to whomever they please. To test this
practice, Mr. Larson himself applied for and received his own Federal
Firearms License only five weeks after he sent in his application.' 7 No
one interviewed him or checked to verify the information on his
application. As far as the federal government was concerned, he was free
to start placing orders from his residential Baltimore home immediately.
Mr. Larson devotes a substantial portion of the book, Lethal Pasages,
to tracing the history of the ATF in order to determine how what was
essentially a tax collecting agency became the nation's sole firearms
policing agency, and he concludes that this role came largely by default.
During Prohibition, bootlegging became increasingly violent and the
criminal use of guns increased dramatically. Thus, the agency that was
14. Id. at 113.
15. Id. at 121.
16. Id. at 123.
17. Id. at 125-26.
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entrusted with enforcing the liquor laws became, de facto, the agency
involved with firearms regulation.18 It was also during Prohibition that
crime and guns, particularly the Thompson submachine gun favored by Al
Capone, became inextricably linked.' 9  Prompted by the growing
bloodshed, the National Firearms Act of 193420 attempted to regulate the
ownership of machine guns by requiring the purchaser to register the gun
and pay a $200 tax. The Federal Firearms Act of 19382 required the
licensing of gun dealers for the first time and "set the cost of a license at
a whopping one dollar. , 22 Larson points out that, even then the NRA was
eager to protect the rights of gun dealers and had argued that the license
fee should be lowered to fifteen cents.23
After the high profile assassinations in the late 1960s, Congress
enacted a more comprehensive set of firearms laws, called the Gun
Control Act of 1968.24 Mr. Larson says that it was at this time that the
National Rifle Association became the formidable foe of gun control and
anyone who supported it.25 The role of the NRA in the gun control debate
is so enormous and pervasive that it is difficult to comprehend how it
became so powerful a force. Mr. Larson attempts to explain this
phenomenon by placing the blame on then-President Ronald Reagan and
a few other Congressional supporters who promised to dismantle the hated
ATE This explanation falters, however, because as Mr. Larson later
discloses, President Reagan was forced to back off from abolishing the
ATF largely due to popular support. Thus, the agency survives today,
although with weakened power, to prosecute gun dealers.
Indeed, Mr. Larson's failure to provide a convincing explanation for
the powerful hold that the NRA has on politicians at the federal level is a
weakness in this otherwise comprehensive and eminently readable book.
Perhaps his difficulty stems from the nature of political influence and
lobbying, which has traditionally been a "behind the scenes" operation,
and thus not available for critical public scrutiny. Or perhaps the problem
lies in the author's own ambivalence with the organization itself. Mr.
18. Id. at 129.
19. Id. at 133.
20. 48 Stat. 1236 (1934) ch. 757.
21. 52 Stat. 1250 (1938) ch. 850.
22. LARSON, supra note 1, at 135.
23. Id.
24. Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968) (as codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-930
(1988)).
25. LARSON, supra note 1, at 137.
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Larson readily admits to becoming a member of the NRA and to enjoying
the pleasures of gun ownership, yet he certainly does not hesitate to be
critical of the organization on occasion. However, the power and
influence of the NRA has in the past and continues to this day to be
disproportionate to its size, and a more thorough treatment of this topic
would have been in order.
After analyzing the questions of how such a weapon as the Cobray
came to be a consumer item and how it got into the hands of a minor, Mr.
Larson bravely attempts to tackle the question of why Americans feel the
need to possess such instruments of destruction, or at least why they feel
it is necessary to preserve such a possessory right. Instead of merely
relying on Second Amendment considerations, a favorite fall-back of
militia and patriot paramilitary organizations around the country,2 6 Mr.
Larson attempts to examine American "culture" to find an explanation.
This is a difficult proposition, but he does a plausible and original job of
it. His chilling statement that "th]omicide, or rather the homicide fantasy,
is the engine that drives America's fascination with guns," 27 leads into a
discussion of the popularity of gun magazines and the thriving mail order
bomb and munitions business. All types of media come under sharp attack
here as bearing some responsibility for nurturing firearms violence in
America. "Gunwriters, TV and movie producers, and the daily press
directly and indirectly stoke demand for exotic firearms and accessories
and orchestrate the bloodthirsty mood that infuses the gun culture."2 8
Again, an analysis of the role of the NRA in shaping this gun cult could
have provided some helpful insights.
Nicholas Eliot was arrested immediately after the shootings and was
charged with one count of murder, four counts of attempted murder, and
fourteen other related offenses. He pleaded guilty to the murder and to
thirteen of the most serious offenses. He was sentenced to life in prison
for the murder and sixty-four years in prison for the remaining charges,
yet he will be eligible for parole in 2004.29
But what of the other players in this tale of a single gun from design
to homicide? While Guns Unlimited was not charged with violating
federal laws by selling a gun to a minor, it was found liable for damages
in a civil negligence suit brought by the family of the slain teacher.
26. Text of ADL Report on Right Wing Militants, U.S. Newswire, Nov. 16, 1994,
available in LEXIS, News Library, USNWR File.
27. LARSON, supra note 1, at 163.
28. Id. at 194.
29. Id. at 204.
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However, another civil suit brought against the manufacturer was
dismissed on the grounds that there was no defect for product liability
purposes. Nicholas' mother filed a suit for $1 million against the school
district for creating and maintaining an environment that led to his mental
collapse, but this suit was later withdrawn. No mention was made of any
criminal action against his mother for her role in purchasing the bullets.
As was previously discussed, Nicholas' cousin was sentenced to prison for
purchasing a gun for a minor. A telling point is that federal charges were
brought only against the ultimate consumers, while those early on in the
chain of responsibility had only to contend with the threat of civil liability.
So what, if anything, can be done to stop, or at least slow, America's
suicidal romance with firearms? While many states and local governments
have enacted their own gun control measures, Mr. Larson does not find
these effective since existing federal laws contain gaping loopholes that
allow the free flow of guns from legitimate channels to the "bad guys."30
Without comprehensive national legislation, moving weapons from the
"easier" states or cities into the tougher ones is too easy. In spite of his
overall sense of futility of the efficacy of legislation to solve the
problem-gun laws are easy to evade, or ineffective even if followed-Mr.
Larson proposes to replace the assortment of existing state regulations with
one uniform, rational federal code that recognizes guns as "the single most
dangerous, socially costly, culturally destabilzing consumer product
marketed in America."3' This "code," as loosely described in the book,
would, among other things, make it more difficult to become a gun dealer,
place a greater recordkeeping burden on those dealers who do qualify for
licenses, require all prospective buyers to get a license-to-purchase, and
involve the Consumer Product Safety Commission in the design of all
consumer weapons.
Yet Mr. Larson recognizes that his proposed "Life and Liberty
Preservation Act doesn't have a chance in hell of being passed."32 But
why, given that the overwhelming percentage of Americans support gun
regulation of some sort? Again, why are the gun lobbyists so successful?
Mr. Larson rather weakly speculates that it is because those who favor
strong regulation lack the conviction of those who oppose such laws.
"The vociferous few dominate the debate."33 This note of hopelessness
and helplessness may be a fitting way to end this book, given the
30). Itd. at 211.
31. Id. at 217.




continuing controversy over gun control in the American political arena
today. In 1994, after an epic battle, Congress passed a $30 billion crime
bill that contained a ban on a variety of assault weapons, including the
Uzi, the Colt AR-15, the TEC-9 and the Street Sweeper.34 Less than five
months later, the issue of gun control is again on the front of the
legislative burner, with the new Republican majority in Congress vowing
to repeal the ban as part of its "Contract with America." President
Clinton has promised to veto any such legislation, 35 but it is unclear if the
Senate has enough votes to override the veto. What is clear however, is
that gun control will remain a political football as long as the NRA and
other gun lobbyists remain political forces.
But is legislation the only way to curb weapon abuses? In this book,
Mr. Larson barely touches upon the potential of using civil remedies as a
means of indirect gun control, yet this is an area that at least has potential
for effectiveness. Civil courts have, so far, been outside the arena of the
gun lobby influence and juries have demonstrated a willingness to punish
irresponsible retailers and distributors. 36  As yet, the law of products
34. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§§ 110101-06, 108 Stat. 1796, 1996-2010.
35. Katherine Q. Seeley, Congressional Roundup: Crime, Another Battle on Guns on
Hand, N. Y. TIMEs, Jan. 20, 1995, at A24.
36. Many of these negligence cases have turned on the question of whether a firearm
transferor's violation of state or federal law in selling a gun to an adult was negligence
per se and significantly contributed to the shooting death or injury of a third party.
Several courts have found liability under the notion of a statutory duty to protect the
public from harm. See Franco v. Bunyard, 547 S.W.2d 91 (Ark. 1977) (holding: failure
of a gun seller to have an adult buyer complete the ATF Form 4473 raised questions of
fact precluding summary judgment; violation of statute was evidence of negligence, the
handgun having been sold to an escaped felon who at the time of the purchase had no
wallet, no money, no driver's license, nor any other means of identification); Decker v.
Gibson Products, 679 F.2d 212 (11 th Cir. 1982) (holding whether a gun dealer's conceded
violation of a federal statute prohibiting the sale of a firearm to an ex-convict constituted
negligence per se, precluded summary judgment for the dealer in an action by the
surviving children of a woman who was murdered with the illegally sold gun).
In the absence of any state or federal statute, courts have also precluded common-law
liability of sellers for injury or death of a third person. See Cullum & Boren - McCain
Mall, Inc. v. Peacock, 592 S.W.2d 442 (Ark. 1980) (arguing sufficient evidence existed
of negligence in the record to submit the case to the jury where it was obvious seller's
employees had been suspicious of the buyer, but sold the gun to him nonetheless); Angell
v. F. Avanzini Lumber Co., 363 So.2d 571 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (holding a petition
which alleged the sale of a firearm and ammunition to an apparently disturbed adult who
then shot plaintiff's decedent states a cause of action precluding dismissal).
Indeed, suits against large, general retailers, such as Sears, J.C. Penneys, Kmart and
Wal-Mart, have been so prevalent and successful that several of them no longer offer
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liability has not been particularly successful in curbing the manufacture of
assault-type weapons, 3 but there have been recent instances indicating that
courts might be willing to declare such weapons to be "ultrahazardous"
and thereby subject to tort liability.38 Surely the recent public outcry over
the marketing of the so-called "Black Rhino" bullet shows that Americans
have reached their limit in tolerating lethal weapons.39 If Mr. Larson ever
wished to do a sequel to this book he would do well to examine the civil
side of the picture.
Whether there is a sequel or not, however, this book stands on its
own as a gripping tale of violence in contemporary America and an
insightful analysis of how we got to this point. The reader cannot fail to
be impressed by the urgency of the author's message and the importance
of finding a solution. As Mr. Larson phrases the issue at the book's
end-"When guns are easy to get, the wrong people get them easily. "4
over-the-counter sales of firearms, but rely on catalog sales only. See generally Who's
Minding the Gun Counter? Bus. WK., Oct. 25, 1993, 120.
37. In the majority of cases brought against manufacturers of handguns by or on behalf
of victims who were shot by criminals using these handguns, summary judgments were
granted in favor of manufacturers on product liability grounds either under a consumer
expectations test or a risk/utility test, where victims did not allege that there was anything
functionally wrong with handguns, the guns functioned precisely as they were designed,
and dangers of handguns were obvious and well known to all members of consuming
public. See Patterson v. Gesellschaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206 (N.D. Tex. 1985) (allowing
summary judgment in products liability action against manufacturer of handgun brought
by mother of victim shot and killed during robbery since it was conceded that gun did not
malfunction); Moore v. R. G. Industries, Inc., 787 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1986) (disallowing
strict liability on the manufacturer of a .25 caliber automatic handgun for injuries
sustained by a woman who was intentionally shot by her husband, where the handgun was
not defective in design, since it performed as intended, and since its risks do not outweigh
its benefits). But cf Kelley v. R. G. Industries, Inc. 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1985) (ruling
that to generally impose strict liability upon the manufacturers as marketers of handguns
would be contrary to public policy; nevertheless holding that the imposition of strict
liability upon the manufacturers of handguns commonly known as Saturday Night Specials
would not be contrary to public policy).
38. See Richman v. Charter Arms Corp. 571 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. La. 1983)
(concluding that the mother of a victim murdered by a handgun could not recover on the
theory that marketing handguns to the general public was unreasonably dangerous. The
gun manufacturer's option for summary judgment was denied because a genuine dispute
existed as to whether the handgun manufacturer's marketing practices were ultra-
hazardous). But cf. Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc. 743 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. Ill.
1984) (holding that recovery against a manufacturer could not be predicated on strict
liability in tort or on the theory that a manufacturer of handguns was engaged in an ultra-
hazardous activity which gave rise to liability).
39. Paul Leavitt, 'Rhino' Ammo OK'd, USA TODAY, Jan. 9, 1995, at 3A.
40. LARsON, supra note 1, at 208.
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LETHAL LAWS. By Jay Sirnkin, Aaron Zelman, & Alan M.
Rice. Milwaukee, Jews for the Preservation of Firearms
Ownership, 1994. Pp. 347. $24.95
Reviewed by David B. Kopel*
"If someone comes to kill you, rise up and kill him first."
The Talmud.'
This book ought to be a non-controversial item that will quickly find
its way onto the shelves of all libraries with an interest in international
law. The authors' method is quite standard: a compilation from seven
nations of statutes on a particular subject. The translation of the statutes
into English is meticulous, and each of the statutes is accompanied by
commentary explaining its significance.2
In addition, as the legal academy works to improve itself at hearing
voices which have too long been ignored, this book makes a profound
effort to bring to our attention the lives of people, such as persecuted
ethnic minorities, who have been marginalized by scholarly research.
But in fact, this book will likely be bought by few law school
libraries. It is unlikely to be reviewed in the usual international law
journals, because in a number of ways, the book is so politically incorrect.
What is "wrong" with this book? First, its lead author is an
economist, not a law professor or even an attorney. Second, the topic of
the book is gun control statutes in nations which have perpetrated genocide
* Research Director, Independence Institute, Golden, Colorado; Associate Policy
Analyst, Cato Institute, Washington, D.C. The author would like to thank Lloyd Cohen,
Donald Dripps, James Don Kates, and Bob Weisberg for their helpful comments. Errors
are the author's alone.
1. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SANHEDRIN 72A, discussed in George P. Fletcher, Self-
Defense as a Justification for Punishment, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 859, 861 (1991).
2. The book's copyright notice requires the following source citation: LETHAL LAWS,
JAY SIMKIN, AARON ZELMAN, & ALAN M. RiCE, JEWS FOR THE PRESERVATION OF
FIREARMS OwNERSHEP, INC., 2872 South Wentworth Avenue, Milwaukee, WI 53207,
(414) 769-0760.
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in the twentieth century. Third, the book's insistent thesis is that gun
control paves the way for genocide.
I. THE NATIONS
The core of the book-the translations of the various foreign laws-is
excellent, and should serve as a model for similar books on other subjects.
On the even-numbered pages are photocopies of the foreign laws. On the
odd-numbered, facing pages, are English translations of the laws. The
foreign statutes are photocopied from foreign statute books. Copies of the
cover and publication information pages from the foreign statute books are
provided as well. This approach encourages the most accurate translations,
since any person who can read the language of the foreign statute can
instantly verify the accuracy of the translation. Meticulous citations make
the book all the more credible and valuable as a reference work.
While the authors do an excellent job in compiling the various foreign
statutes (many of which, such as Ottoman Empire statutes from 1860, are
quite obscure), the authors run into a serious difficulty as they attempt to
analyze the various gun laws in their historical context in each nation. As
the authors acknowledge, only the Nazi genocide has been carefully
investigated.3 The victims of most of the other genocides were much less
likely than European Jews to be able to write Western languages (or to be
able to write at all). Accordingly, they were less able to leave any kind
of record for history. Likewise, most genocidal regimes of the twentieth
century were considerably less devoted than the Nazis were in recording
their own activities.
Let us now turn to the individual nations whose gun control laws and
genocide records form the core of Lethal Laws.
A. Armenia
After the government of the Ottoman Empire quickly crushed an
Armenian revolt in 1893, tens of thousands of Armenians were murdered
by mobs armed and encouraged by the government. As anti-Armenian
mobs were being armed, the government attempted to convince Armenians
to surrender their guns.4 A 1903 law banned the manufacture or import
of gunpowder without government permission.5 In 1910, manufacturing
3. Snmcw ET AL., supra note 2, at 63.




or importing weapons without government permission, as well as carrying
weapons or ammunition without permission was forbidden.
During World War I, in February 1915, local officials in each
Armenian district were ordered to surrender quotas of firearms. When
officials surrendered the required number, they were executed for
conspiracy against the government. When officials could not surrender
enough weapons from their community, the offirials weye executed f%
stockpiling weapons. Armenian homes were also searched, and firearms
confiscated. Many of these mountain dwellers had kept arms despite prior
government efforts to disarm them.7
The genocide against Armenians began with the April 24, 1915
announcement that Armenians would be deported to the interior. The
announcement came while the Ottoman government was desperately afraid
of an Allied attack that would turn Turkey's war against Russia into a two-
front war. In fact, British troops landed at Gallipoli in western Turkey the
next day. Although the Anglo-Russian offensives failed miserably, the
Armenian genocide continued for the next two years. 8 Some of the
genocide was accomplished by shooting or cutting down Armenian men.
The bulk of the 1 to 1.5 million Armenian deaths, however, occurred
during the forced marches to the interior. Although the marches were
ostensibly for the purpose of protecting the Armenians through relocation,
the actual purpose was to make the marches so difficult (for example, by
not providing any food) that survival was impossible.9
The Armenian genocide differs from the six other genocides detailed
in Lethal Laws in one important respect. Although many Armenians
apparently complied with the gun control laws and the deportation orders,
some did not. For example, in southern Syria (then part of the Ottoman
Empire), "the Armenians refused to submit to the deportation order ....
Retreating into the hills, they took up a strategic position and organized
an impregnable defense. The Turks attacked and were repulsed with huge
losses. They proceeded to lay siege." 10 Eventually 4,000 survivors of the
siege were rescued by the British and French." These Armenians who
6. Id. at 81, 94.
7. SuMKIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 82.
8. Id. at 79.
9. Id. at 83
10. Id.
11. Yves Ternon, Report on the Genocide of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire,
1915-16 in A CRIME OF SILENCE: TE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE 117-18 (Gerald Libridian
ed., London, Zed Books 1985), quoted in SMKIN ET AL., supra note 2 at 83.
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grabbed their guns and headed for the hills are the converse to the vast
numbers of Armenian and other genocide victims in Lethal Laws who
submitted quietly; although many of the Armenian fighters doubtless died
from lack of medical care, starvation, or gunfire, so did many of the
Armenians who submitted. As was the case of the Jewish resistance
during World War II, armed resistance was enormously risky, but the
resisters had a far higher survival rate than the submitters.
B. Soviet Union
As the authors note, the Bolsheviks were a minority of Communists
in a vast and disparate nation where Communists themselves were a tiny
minority. It should not be surprising that the Bolsheviks worked hard to
ensure that any person potentially hostile to them did not possess arms."2
The first Soviet gun controls were imposed during the Russian Civil
War, as Czarists, Western troops, and national independence movements
battled the central Red regime. Firearm registration was introduced in
August 1918.13 On August 30, Fanny Kaplan supposedly wounded Lenin
during an assassination attempt; the attempted assassination spurred a
nationwide reign of terror. 4 In October 1918, the Council of People's
Commissars (the government) ordered the surrender of all firearms,
ammunition, and sabres." As has been the case in almost every nation
where firearms registration has been introduced, registration proved a
prelude to confiscation. Exempt from the confiscation order, however,
were members of the Communist Party. 6 A 1920 decree imposed a
mandatory minimum penalty of six months in prison for (non-Communist)
possession of a firearm, even where there was no criminal intent. 7




16. Financial rewards were offered for informants who turned in persons possessing
unlicensed guns. Decree of the Council of People's Commissars, 10 December 1918,
reprinted in 4 DECREES OF SOVIET POWER 123 (Moscow 1968), reprinted in SIMKIN ET
AL, supra note 2, at 123.
17. SIMKIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 98.
The decree also specified that minors could not be given arms unless the license
specified the name of an adult who would be responsible. As in New York City (for
handguns) and New Jersey (for all guns) under current laws, unlicensed persons were not
permitted even for a moment to touch a firearm, even for supervised use at a range.
Decree of the Council of People's Commissars on the Issuing, Keeping, and Handling of
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After the Red victory in the Civil War, the firearms laws were
consolidated in a Criminal Code, which provided that unauthorized
possession of a firearm would be punishable by hard labor.' 8 A 1925 law
made unauthorized possession of a firearm punishable by three months of
hard labor, plus a fine of 300 rubles (equal to about four months' wages
for a highly-paid construction worker).' 9
Stalin apparently found little need to change the weapons control
structure he had inherited. His only contributions were a 1935 law
making illegal carrying of a knife punishable by five years in prison and
a decree of that same year extending "all penalties, including death, down
to twelve-year-old children."2 0
This chapter of Lethal Laws summarizes the genocide perpetrated by
Stalin from 1929 to 1953, starting with his efforts to collectivize farming
by destroying the class of property-owning farmers. Altogether, about
twenty million people were murdered, worked to death in slave labor
camps, or deliberately starved to death by Stalin's government. From
1929 to 1939, Stalin killed about ten million people, more than all the
people who died during the entirety of World War 1. Stalin's successful
campaign of genocide against the Kulaks and against dissident Communists
served as a model for similar campaigns in China and Cambodia.21
C. Germany
German gun control laws are the authors' area of expertise. Mr.
Simkin and Mr. Zelman have previously written a book analyzing the
Weimar and Nazi gun laws in great detail.22 The German chapter in
Lethal Laws contains the most relevant statutes and regulations, but does
Firearms, reprinted in 9 DECREES OF SOVIET POWER 104 (Moscow, 1978), reprinted in
SnMKIN ET AL, supra note 2, at 129. ("It is absolutely forbidden to hand over weapons
to anyone, whether for temporary use, or for storage.")
18. SJmKIN ET AL, supra note 2, at 101.
19. Id.
20. Id. The "crime bill" enacted by the United States Congress in August 1994
provides for the death penalty for offenders as young as thirteen-years-old. Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 199th Pub. L. No. 103-332, 108 Stat. 1796.
21. Id. at 100-04.
22. JAY SIMI uN & AARON ZELMAN, "GUN CONTROL": GATEWAY TO TYRANNY
(1992). The authors' copyright permission requires the following exact citation: "GUN
CONTROL": GATEWAY TO TYRANNY, JAY SImN & AARON ZELMAN, JEWS FOR THE
PRESERVATION OF FIREARMS OwNERSHIP, 2872 South Wentworth Avenue, Milwaukee,
WI 53207, (414) 767-0760.
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not include gun registration forms and similar materials found in the
previous book. Because Lethal Laws does contain more analysis of the
German gun laws in their social context, Lethal Laws is the more valuable
book to anyone except a specialist in German law.
After Germany's defeat in World War I, the democratic Weimar
government, fearing (with good cause) efforts by Communists or the
militaristic right to overthrow the government, ordered the surrender of all
firearms. Governmental efforts to disarm the civilian population-in part
to comply with the Versailles Treaty-apparently ended in 1921.23
The major German gun control law (which was supplemented, but not
repealed, by the Nazis) was enacted by a center-right government in
1928.24 The law required a permit to acquire a gun or ammunition and a
permit to carry a firearm. Firearm and ammunition dealers were required
to obtain permits to sell and to keep a register of their sales. Also,
persons who owned guns that did not have a serial number were ordered
to have the dealer or manufacturer stamp a serial number on them.
Permits to acquire guns and ammunition were to be granted only to
persons of "undoubted reliability,"25 and carry permits were to be given
"only if a demonstration of need is set forth."26 Apparently police
discretion cut very heavily against permit applicants. For example, in the
town of Northeim, only nine hunting permits were issued to a population
of 10,000 people.27
In 1931, amidst rising gang violence (the gangs being Nazi and
Communist youths), carrying knives or truncheons in public was made
illegal, except for persons who had firearm carry permits under the 1928
law. Acquisition of firearms and ammunition permits was made subject
to proof of "need. "
28
When the Nazis took power in 1933, they apparently found that the
1928 gun control laws served their purposes; not until 1938 did the Nazis
bother to modify the 1928 law. The leaving of the Weimar law in place
cannot be attributed to lethargy on the Nazis' part; unlike some other
totalitarian governments (such as the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia), the
Nazis paid great attention to legal draftsmanship and issued a huge volume
23. SIMKIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 150.




28. Id. at 152.
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of laws and regulations.29 The only immediate change the Nazis made to
the gun laws was to bar the import of handguns."0
Shortly after the Nazis took power, they began house-to-house
searches to discover firearms in the homes of suspected opponents. They
claimed to find large numbers of weapons in the hands of subversives. 3'
How many weapons the Nazis actually recovered may never be known.
But as historian William Sheridan Allen pointed out in his study of the
Nazi rise to power in one town: "Whether or not all the weapon
discoveries reported in the local press were authentic is unimportant. The
newspapers reported whatever they were told by the police, and what
people believed was what was more important than what was true."32
Four days after Hitler's triumphant Anschluss of Austria in March
1938, the Nazis finally enacted their own firearms laws. Additional
controls were layered on the 1928 Weimar law: Persons under eighteen
were forbidden to buy firearms or ammunition; a special permit was
introduced for handguns; Jews were barred from businesses involving
firearms; Nazi officials were exempted from the firearms permit system;
silencers were outlawed; twenty-two caliber cartridges with hollow points
were banned; and firearms which could fold or break down "beyond the
common limits of hunting and sporting activities" became illegal.33
On November 9, 1938 and into the next morning, the Nazis unleashed
a nationwide race riot. Mobs inspired by the government attacked Jews
in their homes, looted Jewish businesses, and burned synagogues, with no
interference from the police. 34 The riot became known as "Kristallnacht"
("night of broken glass"). 35  On November 11, Hitler issued a decree
forbidding Jews to possess firearms, knives, or truncheons under any
circumstances, and to surrender them immediately.36
29. Id. at 153. The Nazis (on a pages per year basis) issued laws and regulations at
2.5 times the rate of the Weimar government. Id. at 155.
30. Id. at 153.
31. WILLIAM SHERIDAN ALLEN, THE NAZI SEIZURE OF POWER: THE EXPERIENCE OF
A SINGLE GERMAN TOWN, 1922-1945, at 184-85 (1984), quoted in SIMKIN ET AL., supra
note 2, at 154.
32. Id.
33. SIMKIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 163-70.
34. As the then-head of the German police, Hermann G6ring, stated, "I refuse the
notion that the police are protective troops for Jewish stores. The police protect whoever
comes into Germany legitimately, but not Jewish usurers." RESTRICrTNG HANDGUNS:
THE LIBERAL SKEnrcs SPEAK OUT 188 (Don B. Kates, Jr. ed., 1979).
35. SIMKIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 156.
36. Id. at 156.
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Nazi mass murders of Jews began after the invasion of the Soviet
Union. Extermination camps were not set up until late 1941, so mass
murder was at first accomplished on by special S.S. units, Einsatzgruppen,
on June 22, 1941. Working closely with regular army units, the
Einsatzgruppen would move swiftly into newly-conquered areas, to
prevent Jews from fleeing. In some cases, Jews were ordered to register
with the authorities, an act which made them easy to locate for murder
shortly thereafter. As noted above, most of the Soviet population had
been disarmed by Lenin and Stalin or had never possessed arms in the first
place.37 Raul Hilberg, a leading scholar of the Nazi military, summarizes
that
The killers were well armed, they knew what to. do, and they
worked swiftly. The victims were unarmed, bewildered, and
followed orders. . . . It is significant that the Jews allowed
themselves to be shot without resistance. In all reports of the
Einsatzgruppen there were few references to "incidents." The
killing units never lost a man during a shooting operation ...
In the Atlanta suburb of Brownsville in 1906, the press incited the city over a non-
existent epidemic of assaults on white women by blacks; a wave of beatings and shooting
of blacks followed. The police arrested Negroes who armed themselves against further
attack. AMERICAN VIOLENCE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 237 (Richard Hofstadler &
Michael Wallace, eds., 1971); see also RICHARD MAXWELL BROWN, STRAIN OF
VIOLENCE: HISTORICAL STUDIES IN AMERICAN VIOLENCE AND VIGILANTISM 210-11
(1975).
In Michigan, handgun permit laws were enacted after Dr. Ossian Sweet, a black,
shot and killed a person in a mob that was attacking his house because he had just moved
into an all-white neighborhood. The Detroit police stood nearby, refusing to restrain the
angry crowd. Don B. Kates, Jr., History of Handgun Prohibition in the United States,
in RESTRICTING HANDGUNS: THE LIBERAL SKEPTICS SPEAK OUT, supra note 34, at 19.
Indicted for first degree murder, Sweet was acquitted after a lengthy trial at which
Clarence Darrow served as his attorney. Black newspapers such as the Amsterdam News
and the Baltimore Herald vigorously defended blacks' right to use deadly force in self-
defense against a mob. Walter White, The Sweet Trial, CRISIS, Jan. 1926, at 125; IRVING
STONE, CLARENCE DARROW FOR THE DEFENSE 529-47 (1941); HERBERT SHAPIRO,
WHITE VIOLENCE AND BLACK RESPONSE: FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO MONTGOMERY
188-96 (1988).
Darrow summed up for the jury: "[Tlhey may have been gunmen. They may have
tried to murder. But they were not cowards . . . . [E]leven of them go into a house,
gentlemen, with no police protection, in the face of a mob, and the hatred of a
community, and take guns and ammunition and fight for their rights, and for your rights
and for mine, and for the rights of every other human being that lives." CLARENCE
DARROW, ATTORNEY FOR THE DAMNED 241-42 (Arthur Weinberg ed., 1957).
37. See supra text accompanying notes 12-16.
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[T]he Jews remained paralyzed after their first brush with death
and in spite of advance knowledge of their fate.3" (emphasis
added).
How could Jews with "advance knowledge of their fate" allow themselves
to be murdered? The authors suggest that
These Jews' passivity doubtless was the result of centuries of
victimization in Russia. They had come to believe that being
victimized was normal. In most cases in Jewish experience, the
victimizers were satisfied after the first few victims. In such
situations, resisting was likely to prolong the victimization, and
thus to increase the number of victims. Most Jews did not
realize that the Nazis were different. Most Jews did not realize
the Nazis had no use for living Jews.
On top of this tendency to accept being victimized, twenty years
of Communist rule-of which Stalin's terror had occupied ten
years-had shown Jews that failure to obey orders was a fatal
mistake.39
Although many Jews remained passive throughout the Holocaust,
some did not. In 1943, the Nazis attempted to commence the liquidation
of the Warsaw ghetto. 4' But as the Nazis moved in, members of the
Jewish Fighting Organization opened fire. "[T]he shock of encountering
resistance evidently forced the Germans to discontinue their work in order
to make more thorough preparations." 41 The revolt continued, leading
Goebbels to note in his diary: "This just shows what you can expect from
Jews if they lay hands on weapons." 42 Although the Jews of the Warsaw
38. RAUL HILBERG, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS 318-20 (1985).
39. SuIKN ET AL., supra note 2, at 157.
40. David 1. Caplan, The Warsaw Ghetto: 10 Handguns Against Tyranny, AM.
RIFLEMAN, Feb. 1988, at 31.
41. Caplan, supra note 40.
42. Elliot Rothenberg, Jewish History Refutes Gun Control Activists, AM. RIFLEMAN,
Feb. 1988, at 30.
The Jews had built bunkers with underground tunnels, and grew increasingly well-
armed with rifles, machineguns, handguns, grenades, and other explosives supplied by the
Polish resistance, smuggled out of Nazi factories, or taken from dead Nazi soldiers. A
major Nazi assault began on April 19, with the expectation that the ghetto would be
cleared in time for Hitler's birthday on the 20th. The assault was led by a tank and two
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ghetto were eventually defeated, the Warsaw battle was perhaps the most
significant ever for the Jews, according to Raul Hilberg: "In Jewish
history, the battle is literally a revolution, for after two thousand years of
a policy of submission the wheel had been turned and once again Jews
were using force. ,
43
There were other Jewish uprisings; even in the death camps of
Sobibor and Treblinka, Jews seized arms from the Nazi guards and
attempted to escape. A few succeeded, and more significantly, the camps
were closed prematurely." The authors do not attempt to tell the complete
story of Jewish guerilla resistance during World War II.
4
The German chapter is the most successful in the book. The
perpetrators and the victims of Naziism both left extensive written records,
allowing Simkin, Zelman, and Rice to integrate their always-strong textual
analysis of the gun laws with a discussion of the actual impact of the laws
on the lives of victims.
46
armored cars; a Jewish unit set the tank on fire twice, forcing a Nazi retreat. See SIMKIN
ET AL., supra note 2; Caplan, supra note 40.
The Nazis returned with artillery, and after April 22, Nazi artillery drove many Jews
into the Jewish tunnel system that connected with the sewers. The Nazis used poison
gasses to attempt to clear the Jews out of the sewers. Nazi forces could not directly take
on the buildings where the Jews had built hidden bunkers, cellars, and attics; room-to-
room fighting would have inflicted unacceptably high casualties on the Nazis. So the
Nazis began to burn down the Warsaw ghetto, one building at a time. Explosives and
artillery were used to smash the buildings that were not flammable. On April 25, the Nazi
commanding general recorded in his diary "this evening one can see a gigantic sea of
flames." Even so, the Jewish will to resist was not broken. Finally, on May 15, the
Warsaw synagogue was blown up, and the battle was over. In contrast to the usual result
when the Nazis made an area into a "Jew-free-zone", there was nothing of economic value
for the Nazis to take; to the contrary, the Nazis had been forced to pay a price in order
to take Jewish lives. Id.
43. HILBERG, supra note 38, at 499. For a full discussion of the Warsaw ghetto battle,
see YrrzHAK ZUCKERMAN, A SURPLUS OF MEMORY: CHRONICLE OF THE WARSAW
GHETTO UPRISING (1993); JEWS FOR THE PRESERVATION OF FIREARMS OWNERSHIP, THE
WARSAW GHETTO: THE FIRST BATTLE TO RE-ESTABLISH ISRAEL (1993).
44. SIMKIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 158.
45. The story can be found, among other places, in HAROLD WERNER, FIGHTING
BACK: A MEMOIR OF JEWISH RESISTANCE IN WORLD WAR II (1992); YECHIEL
GRANATSTEIN, THE WAR OF A JEWISH PARTISAN (1986); NECHAMA TEc, DEFIANCE: THE
BiELSKI PARTISANS (1993); and CHAIKA GROSSMAN, THE UNDERGROUND ARMY:
FIGHTERS OF THE BIALYSTOK GHETTO (1987).
For Jewish difficulty in obtaining arms for resistance, see Israel Gutman, The Armed
Struggle of the Jews in Nazi-Occupied Countries, in THE HOLOCAUST 457-98 (Leni Yahil
ed. & Ina Friedman & Haya Galai trans., 1990).
46. Another strength of the chapter is that the authors merely mention in passing, but
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D. China
The China chapter is much less enlightening, mostly because the
victims of Mao's genocide, unlike Hitler's, left much less of a record for
Western historians to uncover. While many scholars agree that about one
million people were murdered during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976),
the number of people who were starved to death by Mao's communization
Congress with his own German text of the law). It is also true that Senator Dodd, as a
Nuremburg prosecutor, had no reason in any of his professional work to need a copy of
the German gun control law. Id. at 79-80. But the fact that Dodd was interested in the
Nazi law is hardly proof, by itself, that the Nazi law was the basis for the American law.
Ultimately, any claim of linkage between the two laws must depend on common
elements in those laws. What similarities do Simkin and Zelman see between the 1938
German law and the 1968 American law? Both laws: exempted the government from the
controls that applied to law-abiding citizens; treated firearms ownership as a privilege
granted by the government rather than as a right; and required that gun buyers meet some
test of reliability. (The 1968 American law requires the gun purchaser to affirm under
felony penalty that he is not a convicted felon, dishonorably discharged from the military,
an alcoholic, a drug user, or otherwise disqualified under federal law.) SIMxRN & ZELMAN,
supra note 22, at 83. All these features are indeed common to the 1938 Nazi and 1968
American laws. But these features are common to virtually any gun control anywhere in
the world. The premise of the vast majority of gun laws around the globe, before and
after 1938, is that the government can be trusted with weapons, but certain classes of
citizens should not, and accordingly gun acquisition or ownership should be regulated by
the government so as to disarm those untrustworthy classes. These three common
features, rather than proving that the American law derives from the Nazi law, simply
prove that American and Nazi law both followed the standard world-wide pattern of gun
control.
A fourth feature common to the Nazi and American laws is more intriguing. The
Nazi law allowed guns with particular features to be banned based on governmental
determination that they were not "sporting." The American law allowed the government
to prohibit the import of guns which the government did not find to be "particularly
suitable for or readily adaptable to sporting purposes." Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub.
L. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 925(d)(3)).
The distinction between supposedly benign "sporting" weapons (supposedly used for
killing animals) and other weapons (which might be used for killing government troops)
is not, however, original to Nazi law. The 1921 Firearms Act in Great Britain, for
example, set up a licensing system for handguns and rifles, but left shotguns unregulated.
Although the Act did not use the word "sporting," the reason that shotguns were treated
differently from rifles and handguns is that shotguns were seen as benign sports
instruments for bird-hunting, whereas rifles and handguns were (in the wake of World
War I) considered military weapons whose main purpose was anti-personnel. DAvID B.
KOPEL, THE SAMURAI, THE MOUNTIE, AND THE CowBoy: SHOULD AMERICA ADOPT THE GUN
CONTROLS OF OTHER DEMOCRACIES? 78-79 (1992).
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of the economy from 1957 to 1960 ("the Great Leap Forward") might be
as low as one million, or a high as thirty million.47
Mao, like Hitler, inherited gun control from his predecessor's
regime.48 A 1912 Chinese law made it illegal to import or possess rifles,
cannons, or explosives without a permit.49 The law was apparently aimed
at the warlords who were contesting the central government's authority;
Chinese peasants were far too poor to afford gunsY° Communist gun
control was not enacted until 1957, when the National People's Congress
outlawed the manufacture, repair, purchase, or possession of any firearm
or ammunition "in contravention of safety provisions."51
E. Guatemala
Perhaps the most overlooked genocide of the twentieth century has
been the Guatemalan government's campaign against its Indian population.
One reason that the genocide has attracted little attention may be that the
Guatemalan government has been friendly to the United States.
Gun control in Guatemala has always been intimately tied to the
military's determination to maintain itself as the dominant institution in
society.52 After taking power with a revolutionary army of just forty-five
men, the Guatemalan government of 1871 speedily decreed the registration
of all "new model" firearms." Registered guns were subject to
impoundment whenever the government thought necessary. 54 In 1873,
firearms sales were prohibited, and firearms owners were required to turn
their guns over to the government.55
Apparently, the enforcement of the 1873 law began to wane. In
1923, General Jose Orellana, who had taken power in a coup a few years
47. SnIAmN ET AL., supra note 2, at 187.
48. Id. at 188.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 190.
52. Id. at 229-234.
53. Id. at 230.
54. Id. at 237. The law actually listed particular firearms manufacturers ("as for
example, a rifle or carbine made by Henry, Winchester, Sneider [sic], Remington, etc.).
Id. The 1871 Guatemalan law was one of the very few brand-specific gun control laws
ever enacted, until American local governments began enacting "assault weapon" bans in
the late 1980's that defined "assault weapon" not by characteristic, but by brand name and
model. David B. Kopel, Hold Your Fire, POL'Y REv., Jan. 1993, at 58.
55. SIMaN ET AL., supra note 2, at 231.
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before, put into force a comprehensive gun control decree.56 The law
barred most firearms imports, outlawed the carrying of guns in towns
(except by government officials), required a license for carrying guns "on
the public roads and railways," set the fee for a carry license high enough
so as to be beyond the reach of poor people, and prohibited ownership of
any gun that could fire a military caliber cartridge."
In 1944, two officers led a revolt against the military government.
"Distributing arms to students and civilian supporters, they soon gained
control of the city [Guatemala City, the capital], and two days later Ponce
[the dictator] resigned, though not before nearly a hundred people had died
in the sporadic fighting." 59 The first free elections in half a century were
held. 6° The new government did not eliminate the gun control laws, but
it did regularize the issuance of carry permits by specifying that the
permits would be issued to an applicant who could "prove his good
character by means of testimonials from two persons of known honesty.'66
In 1952, the democratically-elected government of Jacobo Arbenz
began an agrarian reform plan that expropriated large uncultivated
estates.62 Compensation was based on the taxable value of the land. The
United Fruit Company was angry at the seizure of 386,000 acres of the
company's reserve land in exchange for what the company considered
inadequate compensation.63 In June 1954, a force of Guatemalan exiles,
trained by the CIA, invaded Guatemala from Honduras. 64  "Unable
accurately to assess the situation in the capital, Arbenz resolved to do as
he had done in 1944 and distribute weapons to the workers for the defense
of the government. The army refused to obey, and on 27 June, Arbenz
resigned . "...65
Contrary to the assertion of the authors,' it is unclear whether total
repeal of the gun controls a decade before would have saved the
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 232.
59. PErER CALVEtr, GuATEmA: A NAToN IN ThRmoiL 75 (1985), quoted in SMKIN E " AL.,
supra note 2, at 232.
60. SnMaN ET AL., supra note 2, at 232.
61. Id.
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democratic government. Firearms at a free-market price might still have
been beyond the financial reach of the peasants and students in a very poor
country. What might have made a difference, however, is the actual
distribution of surplus military arms for free to the citizens of Guatemala
while the democratic regime was in power .67 But such a policy was not
implemented, and for all practical purposes, the military retained a
monopoly of fore. As fe authots note, the monopoly "made Arbenz, a
duly elected President, serve at the Military's pleasure. When they
wanted him to go, he went."
68
In November 1960, reformist military officers attempted a coup and
garnered the support of about half the army.69 Peasants, wanting to fight
for their own land, asked the rebels for guns so that the peasants could
join the battle; the rebels refused.70 The coup was finally crushed by
loyalist forces who were supported by the United States.7 From the
1960s to the 1980s, the Guatemalan government found itself engaged in
perpetual counterinsurgency campaigns. As part of these campaigns,
right-wing terror squads were unleashed to murder suspected subversives,
although regular army units also participated extensively." Approximately
100,000 Mayan Indians were murdered by the government during this
period."
Amnesty International has waged a long and courageous campaign
against human rights abuses in Guatemala. 74  The authors reviewing
Amnesty International's proposals for restoring human rights to
Guatemala, note that the group nowhere advocates recognition of a strong
legal right to arms or the arming of the victim populations.75 Instead,
Amnesty argues that the government should control itself better.
The government should also thoroughly review the present
method of reporting and certifying violent deaths, particularly
67. By way of historical precedent, some American colonies bought guns for
militiamen who could not afford their own. Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and
the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REv. 204,215 n.46 (1983).




"72. Id. at 234.
73. Id. at 229.




those resulting from actions taken by any person in an official
capacity. The aim of such an inquiry should be to create
procedures which will ensure that such deaths are reported to the
authorities, who then impartially investigate the circumstances
and causes of the deaths. All efforts should be made to identify
the unidentified bodies that are found in the country and
frequently buried only as "xx", in order to determine time, place
and manner of death and whether a criminal act has been
committed.76
Is the Amnesty proposal realistic? "It seems absurd," write Simkin,
Zelman, and Rice, "to appeal to so blood-drenched a government to
'impartially investigate' atrocities its officials have committed." 7 7
The failure of the Guatemalan government to prosecute its agents for
perpetrating government-sponsored genocide suggests that hopes for
domestic legal reform may be of little use in actually stopping genocide.
As the next two chapters illustrate, international law may be of little
greater practical efficacy.
F. Uganda
If international organizations such as the United Nations were ever
going to intervene to stop a genocide in progress, Uganda in the 1970s
would have been the ideal spot. Ugandan dictator Idi Amin was a world
pariah with no powerful allies. He was generally regarded as insane
(perhaps from advanced venereal disease) and his army was, by world
power standards, pitiful.' 8 From 1990 to 1991, the United States
assembled and led a worldwide coalition which easily drove Iraqi
conquerors out of Kuwait.7 9 A multinational coalition conquest of Uganda
would have been all the easier, since Idi Amin's army was tiny compared
to Saddam Hussein's war machine."0 Kuwait, however, was a strategic oil
76. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, GUATEMALA: TIm HUMAN RIGHTS RECOPD 150-51(1987),
reprinted in SIMKIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 234. By way of disclosure, I should note that
I have been a monthly donor to Amnesty International since 1984.
77. SIMKIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 234.
78. Id. at 275, 280. See also Angus Deming et al., Idi Amin's Rule of Blood,
NEWSWEEK, Mar. 7, 1977, at 29.
79. The MacNeillLehrer NewsHour: Excerpts of Bush News Conference; Saddam's
Future; Gergen & Shields; A Quiet Patriotism (Educ. Broadcasting and GWETA television
broadcast, Mar. 1, 1991).
80. SIMKIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 280; Lee Stokes, Iraq Warns Against Foreign
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resource,"' while Uganda had few resources other than the Ugandan people
who were being slaughtered by their government. Although the existence
of the Ugandan genocide was well-established as it was being perpetrated,
the possibility of a multinational campaign to oust Idi Amin was never
even a topic for serious discussion, whereas discussion about the
reconquest of Kuwait began days after Iraqi tanks entered Kuwait.82
Not once in this century has one nation or a coalition of nations
launched a military action to stop a genocide in progress. It is true that
wars have sometimes led to a genocidal regime being deposed; Tanzania
ousted Amin, and the Allies defeated Hitler. But Tanzania and the Allies
acted only because their territory had been invaded, not because they were
moved to action by reports of the murders within Uganda or within Nazi
Germany.
Notably, even when the Allies were engaged in all-out war against
Hitler, they refused to take military action against the extermination
camps, such as by bombing the rail lines that led to them. 3 As historian
Raul Hilberg writes, "The Allied nations who were at war with Germany
did not come to the aid of Germany's victims. The Jews of Europe had
no allies. In its gravest hour Jewry stood alone, and the realization of that
desertion came as a shock to Jewish leaders all over the world."84 The
people of Uganda likewise stood alone from 1971 to 1979, when Idi
Amin's dictatorship killed about 300,000 people, roughly 2.3 % of the total
population. 5
The authors began their study of Ugandan gun laws with a 1955
statute promulgated by the British imperial government, although this gun
control law may not have been Uganda's first.86  Although the
British/Ugandan law had the length and complexity typical of modern
statutes, the essence was a provision requiring that a person could only
possess a firearm if he had a permit, and the permit would be granted by
the police only upon a discretionary finding regarding the applicant's
"fitness" to possess a firearm.
87
Interference in Kuwait, UPI, Aug. 2, 1990, available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File.
81. Stokes, supra note 80.
82. See excerpt from GEN. NoRMAN SCHWARZKOPF, ScHwARzKOPF, in NEWSWEEK, Sept.
28, 1992, at 52.
83. SIMKiN ET AL., supra note 2, at 159.
84. HiLBERG, supra note 38, at 1048.
85. SmnKIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 269.




Uganda achieved independence in 1962,8 keeping the structure of the
colonial gun laws intact. In 1966, Milton Obote assumed dictatorial
powers. In 1969, Obote tightened the gun laws, imposing a nationwide
ban on firearms and ammunition possession, making exceptions only for
government officials and for persons granted an exemption by the
government.8 9 In 1970, the 1955 British gun law was recodified, with
some minor changes. 90
Idi Amin took power in 1971, and the mass murders began shortly
thereafter. The nation's large Asian population was expelled (not
murdered), and in the process the Ugandan government seized
approximately a billion dollars' worth of the Asians' property. 9' The main
targets of the Ugandan government's mass murders were members of
tribes whom Amin perceived as a threat to his power.92 Because Uganda
had far less of an infrastructure than Nazi Germany, the murders were
perpetrated mostly by bands of soldiers who shot their victims, rather than
through extermination camps. 93
Amin's army numbered about 25,000 and his secret police-the "State
Research Bureau"-only 3,000. 9' The army was ill-disciplined and
incompetent, and collapsed not long after Amin began his ill-advised war
against Tanzania in late 1978.' 5 How could such a small and pathetic
army get away with mass murder against a nation of thirteen million
people? Is it possible that a disarmed Ugandan population was easier to
murder than an armed one?
Idi Amin, by the way, now lives in Saudi Arabia. 96 As far as I know,
there has been no effort to extradite him and put him on trial for murder.
With the exceptions of the rulers of the nations that lost World War II,
none of the perpetrators of genocide in the 20th century have been
prosecuted for crimes against humanity.
G. Cambodia
88. Id. at 272.
89. Id. at 274.
90. Id. at 271, 274, 283-99.
91. Id. at 277.
92. Id. at 276.
93. Id. at 278.
94. Id. at 280.
95. Id.
96. Chet Lunner, Idi Amin Benefits from Desert Storm Protection, GANNErr NEWS
SERVICE, Feb. 11, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, GNS File.
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Also enjoying a comfortable post-genocide life is Pol Pot, the
perpetrator of the best known mass-murders of the post-World War II era.
Cambodian gun control was a legacy of French colonialism. 7 A
series of Royal Ordinances, decreed by a monarchy subservient to the
French, appears to have been enacted out of fear of the Communist and
anti-colonial insurgencies that were taking place in the 1920s and 1930s
throughout Southeast Asia, although not in Cambodia. 98 The first law, in
1920, dealt with the carrying of guns, while the last law in the series, in
1938, imposed a strict licensing system.99 Only hunters could have guns,
and they were allowed to own only a single firearm. 1° These colonial
laws appear to have stayed in place after Cambodia was granted
independence. The Khmer Rouge enacted no new gun control laws, for
they enacted no laws at all other than a Constitution. 0'
Cambodia was a poor country, and few people could afford guns. 1
0 2
On the other hand, the chaos that accompanies any war might have given
some Cambodians the opportunity to acquire firearms from corrupt or
dead soldiers. There is no solid evidence about how many Cambodians,
with no cultural history of firearms ownership, attempted to do so.'0 3
As soon as the Khmer Rouge took power, they immediately set out
to disarm the populace. One Cambodian recalls that
Eang [a woman] watched soldiers stride onto the porches of the
houses and knock on the doors and ask the people who answered
if they had any weapons. "We are here now to protect you," the
soldiers said, "and no one has a need for a weapon any more."
People who said that they kept no weapons were forced to stand
aside and allow the soldiers to look for themselves. . . . The
round-up of weapons took nine or ten days, and once the soldiers
had concluded the villagers were no longer armed, they dropped
their pretense of friendliness. . . . The soldiers said everyone
would have to leave the village for a while, so that the troops
could search for weapons; when the search was finished, they
could return."°4
97. SIMKiN ET AL., supra note 2, at 305.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 305.
101. Id. at 306.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Alec Wilkinson, A Changed Vision of God, NEW YORKER, Jan. 24, 1994, at 54-55,
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People being forced out of villages and cities were searched thoroughly,
and weapons and foreign currency were confiscated.1 5 To the limited
extent that Cambodians owned guns through the government licensing
system, the names of registered gun owners were of course available to
the new government.106
The Cambodian genocide was unique in the twentieth century, in that
its target was not a single ethnic, religious, or political group, but rather
the entire educated populace. Lacking infrastructure for sophisticated
Nazi-style extermination camps, the Khmer Rouge used the genocide
methods which had been used by the Turkish government (internal
deportations with forced marches designed to kill), the Soviet government
(hard labor under conditions likely to kill), and the Guatemalan
government (murders of targeted victims)."0 7
Like other victims of genocide, the Cambodians forced into slave
labor were kept so desperately hungry that revolt became difficult to
contemplate, as every thought focused on food. One slave laborer
explained that
There was no possibility of an uprising .... Contact between
many people was made impossible by the chlops [informers]
... . Besides, we had no arms and no food. Even if we'd been
able to produce arms and kill the fifty Khmer Rouge in the
village, what would happen to us? We didn't have enough food
to build up any reserves to sustain a guerilla army. In our state
of weakness, after a few days wandering in the jungle, death
would have been inevitable. 108
The authors estimate that Pol Pot and his Khmer Rouge murdered about
a million people, at least 14% of the Cambodian population.0 9 The
quoted in SnIMiN ET AL., supra note 2, at 306. Similarly, one refugee recalled the days
after the Cuban revolution overthrew Batista: "We believed [Castro] when he said we
should surrender our arms because we did not need guns now that we were a free country
• . . [and] we rushed to the police station to give up our guns." Lin Williams, The Rise
of Castro: 'If only we hadn't given up our guns!, MEDINA Courf GAZErrE, Oct. 15, 1976,
at 5.
105. SIMKIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 306.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 312.
108. PN YATHAY, STAY ALIVE, MY SON 102 (N.Y., Simon & Schuster 1987), quotedin
SIMION ET AL., supra note 2, at 314.
109. SIMIAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 315.
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percentage was about the same as the percentage of the Soviet population
murdered by Stalin, except that Pol Pot accomplished in three-and-a-half
years what took Stalin twenty.11"
The mass murders of the Khmer Rouge became well-known in the
international community, but no nation made an effort to try to rescue the
Cambodian people. Finally, Pol Pot was driven from power by a
Vietnamese invasion that was motivated by imperialist, rather than
humanitarian reasons. 11
Pol Pot's fate was thus similar to Idi Amin's: the world would tolerate
genocide, but threatening the borders of a neighboring country would lead
to the regime's demise. According to the New York Times, "Pol Pot is
today a free, prosperous and apparently unrepentant man who, 15 years
after his ouster from Phnom Penh, continues to plot a return to power.
The calls for some sort of international genocide tribunal for Pol Pot and
his aides have not been heard for years.""1
The authors have demonstrated that every nation in the twentieth
century which has perpetrated genocide has chosen a victim population
which was disarmed. If the intended victims were not already "gun-free,"
then the murderous governments first got rid of the guns before they
attempted to begin the killing.
II. IS RESISTANCE PRACTICAL?
The most common argument against an armed population as an
antidote to genocide is that, in the late twentieth century, the balance of
power between governments and the people has tipped decisively towards
the government side. How can a rag-tag collection of citizens with rifles,
pistols, and shotguns hope to resist a modern standing army with artillery,
helicopters, tanks, jets, and nuclear weapons? Such a question is most
frequently posed by persons who have neither personal nor intellectual
familiarity with the military or with guerilla warfare. If we actually try
to answer the question, rather than just presuming the government will
win, then the case for the uselessness of citizen resistance becomes weak
indeed.
110. Id. As with the other nations studied, the authors use a conservative estimate for
the total number of deaths. Other scholars of genocide put the number of killings in
Cambodia much higher. R.3, RUMMEL, DEATH BY GovERNME1m 175 (1994).
111. SMIUN ET AL., supra note 2, at 316.
112. Philip Shenon, Pol Pot, the Mass Murderer Who Is Still Alive and Well, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 6, 1994, § 4 (Business), at 1.
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First, the purpose of civilian small arms in any kind of resistance
scenario is not to defeat the federal army in a pitched battle, and then
triumphantly march into Washington, D.C. Citizen militias and other
popular forces, such as guerilla cadres, have rarely been strong enough to
defeat a professional army in a head-on battle. Guerilla warfare aims to
conduct quick surprise raids on the enemy, at a time and place of the
guerillas' choosing. Almost as soon as the first casualties have been
inflicted, the guerillas flee, before the army can bring its superior
firepower to bear.
In the early years of a guerilla war, as Mao Tse-Tung explained,
before guerrillas are strong enough to attack a professional army head on,
heavy weapons are a detriment, impeding the guerrillas' mobility. As a
war progresses, the guerrillas use ordinary firearms to capture better small
arms and eventually heavy equipment.
11 3
The military history of the twentieth century shows rather clearly that
if guerillas are willing to wage a prolonged war, they can be quite
successful. As one author notes that
Far from proving invincible, in the vast majority of cases in this
century in which they have confronted popular insurgencies,
modern armies have been unable to suppress the insurgents. This
is why the British no longer rule in Israel and Ireland, the French
in Indo-China, Algeria, and Madagascar, the Portuguese in
Angola, the whites in Rhodesia, or General Somoza, General
Battista, or the Shah in Nicaragua, Cuba, and Iran
respectively-not to mention the examples of the United States in
Vietnam and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan." 4
Moreover, guerillas need not overthrow a government in order to
accomplish their purposes. During World War II, Yugoslav partisans did
not directly overthrow the occupying Nazi government, but they did tie
down a large fraction of the entire German army, leaving the German
armies in the Eastern, Western, and Mediterranean fronts that much
weaker. As the war ended, the presence of a well-equipped popular
fighting force, ready to assume power, helped convince the advancing
Soviet armies not to move into Yugoslavia, and consequently set the
113. MAO TSE-TUNG, MAO TsE-TUNG ON GUERLA WARFARE, (S. Griffith trans., 1961),
cited in Raymond Kessler, Gun Control and Political Power, 5 L. & PoL'Y Q. 395 (1983).
114. Kates, supra note 67, at 270.
1995]
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
foundation for a Yugoslavia that would, relative to the rest of Eastern
Europe, be less subject to a Soviet sphere of influence.
A popular guerilla resistance can also deprive an occupying
government of much or all of the economic benefit that would normally
be gained by occupation. And perhaps most importantly for purposes of
this Article, an armed populace can ensure that any efforts to kill people
or to send them to prisons and concentrations camps carry a price that
must be paid by the government. If the Jews of Nazi-occupied Europe
had shot the Nazi soldiers who came to herd them onto cattle cars, the
Jews would still have been killed, but so would some of the Nazis. Would
the Nazis have had such an easy time sending soldiers into the ghettos to
collect the Jews if the soldiers knew that some of them would not come
back alive? If the kind of people who specialize in perpetrating genocide
are bullies by nature, how many bullies are willing to take a chance of
getting shot by the intended victim? If potential massacre victims can
plausibly threaten to harm at least a few of their attackers, then the
calculus of the attackers may change dramatically. As Sanford Levinson
notes, it is not implausible to argue that
"[1]f all the Chinese citizens kept arms, their rulers would hardly
have dared to massacre the [Tiananmen Square] demonstrators
.... " It is simply silly to respond that small arms are
irrelevant against nuclear-armed states .... A state facing a
totally disarmed population is in a far better position, for good or
for ill, to suppress popular demonstrations and uprisings than one
that must calculate the possibilities of its soldiers and officials
being injured or killed."1 5
Finally, even in cases where resistance saves not a single victim's life,
resistance is still better than submission. Lloyd R. Cohen observes that
Dying even futilely defending yourself, your family, and your
group has an honor and a dignity to it that is not vouchsafed by
being helplessly slaughtered. Thus even if none had escaped
from the Warsaw or Vilna Ghettos or the Sobibor extermination
camp, those who took vengeance there honored themselves, their
families, and their people. 116
115. Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing SecondAmendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637,657
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Although the American federal government is the best-armed and
wealthiest in the world, so is the American populace. Approximately half
of all American households possess a gun. 1 7 In the United States, there
is more than one gun for every adult American." 8 Hundreds of thousands
(or millions) of Americans practice "reloading"-the home manufacture
of ammunition-as a hobby." 9  As of the fall of 1994, commercial
American ammunition makers were producing well over a million rounds
of ammunition per day and yet cannot keep up with the immense consumer
demand.12 0  In response to the gun control laws being enacted and
proposed in 1993 and 1994, the American gun-owning public has begun
stockpiling weapons and ammunition in quantities that may be without
historical precedent. ' 2  Now that Guns and Ammo, a magazine with a
circulation of half a million, has begun publishing tips about how to bury
guns for long-term storage, it is safe to assume that a rather large number
of gun owners are putting away a great deal of provisions for a rainy
day. 1
22
Everything else that a guerilla army could want is also abundant in
America: binoculars, camouflage (owned by millions of hunters), ham
radios and other sophisticated communications equipment, and abundant
quantities of well-preserved food.
There is something else in abundance in America that guerillas love:
a place to hide. The great swamps of the South, the thick forests of the
Rocky Mountains and the Northwest, and the dense, crowded cities
throughout the nation are only a few of the American locales that would
be eminently suitable to providing havens for guerilla fighters.
The American military is also powerful. But, as the authors point
out, the police and military combined (assuming that every soldier and
every police officer would assist a genocidal government) comprise only
B. Kopel (Nov. 15, 1994) (on file with author).
117. GARY KLECK, PoIrr BLANK 18 (1991).
118. U.S. Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, Press Release, No.
FY-91-35, May 22, 1991 (as updated), cited in SIMKIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 71, 73.
119. Dean Speir, Reloading Equipment: The 1994Reloader's Product Guide, SHOOTING
INDUSTRY, Jan. 1994, at 44, available in LEXIS, News library, ASAPII file.
120. Barnaby J. Feder, As Gun Debate Rages, Ammunition Makers Are Quietly, and
Busily, at Work, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1992, at A20.
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about one percent of the U.S. population. 23 Many of the modern army's
most effective weapons-such as tanks, artillery, and helicopters-are easy
to deploy in a Kuwaiti desert, but considerably less effective in a built-up
city. Indeed, a million dollar tank can be incapacitated by a Molotov
Cocktail (a glass bottle filled with gasoline and topped with a wick that is
lit just before the cocktail is thrown).1 24 As a last resort, a dictatorial
government could initiate nuclear warfare, but such a step would risk
provoking the non-militant fraction of the population into full-scale
rebellion, risk provoking a faction of the army into attempting a coup, and
by destroying the bombed area, certainly deprive the government of any
benefit of controlling the area.
Finally, the most important benefit of defensive arms is their deterrent
power. As long as a potential dictator (or a potentially genocidal dictator)
must take into account very serious risks involved with taking action
against the American people, then the prospect for such actions is being
taken becomes markedly smaller.
No one can forecast exactly what would happen if the American
people took up arms against a dictatorial government. But there is no
evidence from the history of warfare, or from any other source, to support
a simplistic assertion that resistance could not possibly achieve any
success.
123. SIMKIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 69.
124. Id. at 71.
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III. WHEN TO RESIST
A much more plausible objection to the authors' thesis is that, even
though an armed populace can resist genocide, the population may not
know when to resist. Had European Jews shot the soldiers who were
herding them into cattle cars for transportation to concentration camps, the
survival rate for European Jews might have been much higher. But there
were other instances, some of them well-known to European Jewry, where
non-resistance proved to the be the correct approach.
The classic example involves the Babylonian captivity of Biblical
times. As the Babylonian Empire of King Nebuchadnezzar was sweeping
westward, the tiny kingdom of Judea fell within its path. As the final
Judean stronghold, Jerusalem, was besieged, the Jews faced a choice of
surrendering, with the likelihood of being taken into slavery and exile, or
fighting to the last man. The prophet Jeremiah insisted on the former
course, and that is the course Judea's king eventually chose.
As things turned out, that was the right choice historically for the
Jews. The Babylonian captivity turned out not to be terribly arduous;
many Jews grew quite prosperous in Babylon. Captivity in Babylon also
took the Jews away from Canaanite influence, meaning that the continuing
struggle to resist syncretism between Canaanite nature religion and strict
Yahwism was ended. The Judaism that emerged from the Babylonian
captivity was a purer, stronger form of Judaism than the one that had been
under continuous Canaanite assimilative pressure, although some
Babylonian myths and legends were incorporated. Within a few
generations, Babylon was conquered by the Persian Empire of King
Cyrus, and Cyrus allowed many of the Jews to return to Jerusalem and
begin rebuilding the Temple. Eventually, re-establishment of an
independent Judean state was allowed. Acceptance of transportation and
captivity turned out to be a much better long-term choice than a battle to
the last man.
During World War II, the Japanese-Americans who were herded into
concentration camps fared better by accepting several years of confinement
than they would have by taking to the California hills and launching a
guerilla war.
How is one to know that the impending forced march or
transportation by cattle car is intended not merely for an onerous
relocation, but for mass murder? Generally, one cannot. As the authors
point out in their chapter on Germany, the Jewish policy of submission
had been, for over 1800 years, the policy which saved the most Jewish
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lives. 125 Not until the Jews realized the Hitler intended to murder them all
did Jewish resistance groups begin taking action.
Of the seven genocidal governments studied in Lethal Laws, not one
announced its intention to its victims. All of the victims were told that
they were being temporarily relocated or another lie in order to induce
them not to resist. And one of the reasons that the lies were believed by
so many people is that there are many governments throughout world
history which have sent people on forced marches or other forms of forced
relocation and not killed them. 126
One guide for when a subject people should resist may be the people's
assessment of the government's degree of hatred. King Nebuchadnezzar
was no anti-Semite and bore the Jews no more ill will than he bore the
people of any nation he conquered. Hitler was obviously different: hatred
of Jews was one of the fundamental principles of his life, as he had
demonstrated throughout his public career.
Forewarned is forearmed, but the problem of knowing when to take
up arms poses a significant challenge to the authors' thesis that gun
ownership can always prevent genocide. Even if all of the genocide
victims discussed in Lethal Laws had possessed their own semiautomatic
rifle, it is far from certain that they all would have decided at the right
time to shoot enemy soldiers. Still, some of the genocide victims might
have done so, and the more that did so, the less genocide there might have
been. It appears that, despite the hopes of the authors, civilian gun
ownership may sometimes, but not always, prove capable of stopping
genocide.
IV. IT CAN'T HAPPEN HERE
It did happen here. The conquest of North America by the European
settlers of the future United States was accomplished by "the extermination
of some Native American tribes and the near-extinction of others, by U.S.
government forces .... "127 The forced march of the Cherokee people
from the southeastern United States into Oklahoma along the "Trail of
Tears" resulted in the deaths of a large fraction of the Cherokee
125. Id. at 158.
126. For example, some of the forced population exchanges between Greece and
Turkey and the Jewish Diaspora after the failed revolt against the Roman Empire.
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viewed as war between sovereign nations, the war (on both sides) included numerous




population, and at best, differs quantitatively rather than qualitatively from
the 20th-century genocides described in Lethal Laws. Hitler looked with
admiration at how the United States government had cleared the continent
of Indians, and he used the U.S. government's 19th-century policies as a
model for his own 20th-century policies of clearing Lebensraum for the
German people.
In the twentieth century, the United States government forced 100,000
United States citizens into concentration camps."' In 1941, American
citizens of Japanese descent were herded into concentration camps run by
the United States government. 29  Like the victims of other mass
deportations, these Americans were allowed to retain only the property
they could carry with them. Everything else-including family businesses
built up over generations-had to be sold immediately at fire-sale prices
or abandoned.130 The camps were "ringed with barbed wire fences and
guard towers."13 During the war, the federal government pushed Central
and South American governments to round up persons of Japanese
ancestry in those nations and have them shipped to the U.S. concentrationcamps. 132
The American concentration camps were not death camps. The
American-held prisoners were subject to strict discipline, but not to mass
murder. 133 After the American victory at Midway in June 1942, the threat
of a Japanese landing on the mainland U.S. vanished, and the tide in the
Pacific began to turn. 134 Nevertheless, the incarceration of Japanese-
Americans continued long after any plausible national security justification
had vanished.
But, the authors ask, what if the war had gone differently? What if a
frustrated, angry America, continuing to lose a war in the Pacific, had
been tempted to take revenge on the "enemy" that was, in the
concentration camps, a safe target.1 31 Would killing all the Japanese be a
potential policy option? In 1944, by which time America's eventual
victory in the war seemed assured, the Gallup Poll asked Americans,
"What do you think we should do with Japan, as a country, after the
128. Id.
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130. Id. at 23.
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war?" Thirteen percent of Americans chose the response "Kill all
Japanese people."
136
Sadly, Roger Daniels, the author of a recent study of the Japanese
internment, concludes that a concentration camp episode could indeed
happen again in America. 137 He points out that in 1950, a time by which
the oppressiveness and uselessness of the American concentration camps
during World War II had been well-established, Congress enacted the
Emergency Detention Act, which gave the Attorney General unilateral
authority to imprison Americans at will, using the World War II
concentration camps as a model. 13' Fortunately, the law was repealed in
1971, but as Daniels points out, the original detentions occurred even
though they were not authorized by any law. 1
39
Disarming citizens before killing or oppressing them is a time-honored
American tradition. After the Civil War, the first act of the Ku Klux Klan
(like the Khmer Rouge) was to round up all the guns in the hands of ex-
slaves. Only then did other oppressions begin."4 From the middle of the
nineteenth century to the first quarter of the twentieth, race riots in the
United States usually took the form of white mobs rampaging against
innocent blacks. Black attempts to resist or to shoot back were often
followed with governmental efforts to disarm the blacks.' 4'
Are modern Americans so dramatically different from their ancestors
that concentration camps or mob violence are safely confined to the past?
While Mayor of New York City, Edward Koch (who is Jewish) proposed
that the federal government set up concentration camps for drug users, in
remote locations such as Nevada and Alaska.'42 Under Mayor Koch's
successor David Dinkins, after a Jewish religious leader's driver killed a
black child, rampaging black mobs conducted a three-day pogrom against
a Jewish section of Brooklyn and killed an Australian Jew who was
136. Gallup Poll released Dec. 20, 1944, question 2, in 1 THE GALLUP POLL: PuBLIc
OPINION 1935-1971, at 477 (1972).
137. ROGER DANIELS, PRISONERS WrOrur TRIAL: JAPANESE AMERICANS IN WORLD WAR 11114
(1993).
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visiting the United States, while the police passively refused to
intervene. 1
43
Hatemongers such as Louis Farrakhan are now treated as important
leaders by an increasingly large segment of the American black
community, including the NAACP, which for decades before had been
steadfastly opposed to racial hatred and anti-Semitism. In an age of Louis
Farrakhan and Al Sharpton, is America immune from the influence of
bigots, crackpots, hatemongers, or potential dictators? A Klansman and
former Nazi named David Duke was elected to the State House of
Representatives in Louisiana in 1989. He then won 44% of the vote
against the incumbent U.S. Senator in 1990.'" The next year, he won
39% of the vote in a race for Governor, garnering over 60% of the vote
from the white middle-class and from white Protestants. 1
45
What other countries can be presumed forever safe from
hatemongering rule? In August 1994, the Labor Minister of the Italian
government-a government which a half-century earlier was a Fascist ally
of Hitler-blamed the fall of the lira on the "Jewish lobby" in the United
States. 46 Virtually none of the world's democratic nations can boast an
uninterrupted history of democracy, nor can they claim that racist or anti-
Semitic elements are of no significance in the nation's current political
life.
Imagine that the year is 1900. You are told that within fifty years,
a nation in the world will kill over six million members of a religious
minority. Which nation would you pick? If you were well-informed
about world affairs, it is very unlikely that you would pick Germany. In
1900, Germany was a democratic, progressive nation. Jews living there
enjoyed fuller acceptance in society than they did in Britain, France, or the
United States. In 1900, probably much less than 13% of the German
population favored killing all Jews. Thirty-five years later, circumstances
had changed.
The prospect of a dictatorial American government thirty-five years
from now seems almost impossible. What about a hundred years from
today? Two hundred? It is possible to say, with near-certainty, that "it
can't happen here-in the near future." But in the long run, no one can
say; the fact that it did happen here in the nineteenth century, coupled with
143. See Debra Nussbaum, Crown Heights Indictment Raises Hopes, INTERMOUNTAIN
JEWISH NEWS, Aug. 19, 1994, at 7.
144. MiCHAEL BARONE & GRANT UJIFUSA, THE ALMANAC OF AMERIcAN PoLmcs 1994, at
531-32 (1993).
145. Id.
146. Ruth E. Gruber, Italian Leader Blames Jews for Fall of Lira, INTERMOUNTAIN
JEWISH NEWS, Aug. 19, 1994, at 3.
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the fact that American concentration camps were opened in the twentieth
century, ought to suggest that only someone wilfully blind to American
and world history would attempt to guarantee to future generations of
potential American victims that "it can't happen here."
V. THE ROOTS OF THE RIGHT TO ARMS
Lethal Laws' thesis that the ultimate purpose of gun ownership is for
citizens to shoot government troops (or simply to possess arms, thereby
deterring governmental violence) will offend many persons, including
many gun owners, who like to consider gun ownership in the pleasant,
bucolic context of hunting.14 7 But the authors' viewpoint is precisely the
viewpoint of the intellectual world from which the Second Amendment
sprang.
The framers of the American Constitution were strongly of the
opinion that "it could happen here." They drafted the Constitution as a
counterpoint to the abuses of government which they had endured
themselves and which they knew about from history. Not the least of the
these abuses were the French government's mass persecutions of the
disarmed Huguenots in the previous century. Indeed, a sizeable number
of Huguenots fled to the United States.
1 48
After the English Civil War, the Glorious Revolution, and religious
persecutions in 17th-century Great Britain, William Blackstone in the
eighteenth century described the right to arms as the fifth and last
"auxiliary right" of the subject, meant to protect all other rights. The
right "of having arms for their defence" was "a public allowance under
restrictions, of the natural right of resistance self preservation, when the
sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence
of oppression. "149 Sir Walter Raleigh was simply repeating the
conventional wisdom of his age when he noted that a tyrant will seek "to
unarm his people of weapons, money, and all means whereby they resist
his power."150
147. Hunting is obviously not very pleasant for the prey. But unless one is prepared
to go as far as to argue that humans should intervene to prevent animals from hurting each
other, it is difficult to argue that a deer which is killed by a clean shot from a high-
powered hunting rifle is not better off than a deer which dies after being torn apart by a
wolf-pack, or dies a slow, painful death from starvation in the winter.
148. Don B. Kates, Jr., The Second Amendment and the Ideology of Self-Protection,
9 CONST. COMMENTARY 87, 98-99 (1992).
149. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *82.
150. JOYCE MALCOLM, To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS 9 (1994), quotig SIR WALTER RALEIGH,
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The drafters of the American Constitution trusted the people more
than the government, intended the armed populace to be the ultimate check
in the system of checks and balances, and meant to reserve to the
American people the right affirmed in the Declaration of Independence to
"alter or abolish" a tyrannical government. James Madison's friend Tench
Coxe explained that
[T]he powers of the sword are in the hands of the yeomanry of
America from sixteen to sixty. The militia of these free
commonwealths, entitled and accustomed to their arms, when
compared with any possible army, must be tremendous and
irresistible. Who are the militia? Are they not ourselves ...
Congress have no power to disarm the militia. Their swords,
and every other terrible implement of the soldier, are the birth-
right of an American. .... [T]he unlimited power of the sword
is not in the hands of either the federal or state governments, but,
where I trust in God it will ever remain, in the hands of the
people.1
5
Tench Coxe's words from across the centuries are not very different
from those of the late Vice President Hubert Humphrey: "The right of
citizens to bear arms is just one more guarantee against arbitrary
government, one more safeguard against the tyranny which now appears
remote in America, but which historically has proved to be always
possible." 15 2 Consistent with these quotations, virtually every scholar in
the last 15 years who has studied the history of the Second Amendment
finds that it was intended to recognize, not create, a fundamental human
right to possess weapons, a right whose primary purpose was to facilitate
resistance to a tyrannical government.'
3 THE WORKS OF SIR WALTER RALEIGH 22 (T. Birch ed., 1829).
151. Tench Coxe, PA. GAzETTE, Feb. 20, 1788, quoted in Stephen Halbrook, To Keep
and Bear Their Private Arms: The Adoption of the Second Amendment, 1787-1791, 10 N.
KY. L. REv. 13, 17 (1982).
152. Quoted in David Hardy, The Second Amendment As a Restraint on State and
FederalFirearms Restrictions, in RESTRICTING HANDGUNs: THE LmmIAL SKEPTICS SPEAK OUT
184-85 (Don B. Kates, Jr., ed., 1979).
153. Kates, supra note 148, at 90. Armed resistance to criminal government was seen
simply as a larger case of resistance to a lone criminal, a right which was so generally
accepted as to not even be questioned. Id.
Among the more recent articles taking the individual right position are: William Van
Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Arms, 43 DUKE L.J. 1236
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(1994); Akhil Amar, The Bill of Rights As a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1162
(1991); Elaine Scarry, War and the Social Contract: Nuclear Policy, Distribution, and the
Right to Bear Arms, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1257 (1991); Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T.
Diamond, The SecondAmendment: Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO.
L.J. 309, 319 (1991); Stephen P. Halbrook, The Right of the People or the Power of the
State: Bearing Arms, Arming Militias, and the Second Amendment, 26 VAL. U. L. REV.
131, 135 (1991).
See e.g., Levinson, supra note 115; STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, A RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS:
SrATE AND FEDERAL BILLS OF RIGHrS AND CONsmUHONAL GUARANES (1989); Seqfn Hahn,
Encroachments of the Crown on the Liberty of the Subject: Pre-Revolutionary Origins of
the Second Amendment, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 91 (1989); David Hardy, The Second
Amendment and the Historiography of the Bill of Rights, 4 J.L. & POL'Y 1 (1987); Nelson
Lund, The Second Amendment, Political Liberty and the Right to Self-Preservation, 39
ALA. L. REV. 103 (1987); Robert Shalhope, The Armed Citizen in the Early Republic, 49
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125 (1986); Don B. Kates, Jr., A Dialogue on the Right to Keep
and Bear Arms, 49 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 143 (1986); David Hardy, Armed Citizens,
Citizen Armies: Toward a Jurisprudence of the Second Amendment, 9 HARv. J.L. & PuB.
POL'Y 559 (1986); William Marina, Weapons, Technology and Legitimacy: The Second
Amendment in Global Perspective in FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE: ISSUES OF PUBUC POLICY (Don
B. Kates, Jr. ed., 1984); Robert Dowlut, The Current Relevancy of Keeping and Bearing
Arms, 15 U. BAIT. L. REV. 32 (1984); Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the
Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L.REv. 204, 244-52 (1983); Joyce
Lee Malcolm, The Right of the People to Keep and Bear Arms: The Common Law
Perspective, 10 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 285 (1983); Robert Dowlut, The Right to Arms, 36
OKLA. L. REV. 65 (1983); Senate Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., The Right to Keep and Bear Arms (1982); David Caplan,
The Right of the Individual to Bear Arms, 1982 DET. C.L. REV. 789 (1982); Richard E.
Gardiner, To Preserve Liberty-A Look at the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 10 N. Ky.
L. REv. 63 (1982); Robert Shalhope, The Ideological Origins of the Second Amendment,
69 J. AM HIST. 599 (1982); Charles L. Cantrell, The Right to Bear Arms: A Reply, 53
Wis. B. BULL. 21 (1980).
Compare two articles which agree that the Second Amendment does not prevent gun
prohibition today but which acknowledge that the Second Amendment was intended to
confer an individual right. David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen
Militia: The Terrifying Second Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 551 (1991), reasons that since
state governments have neglected their duties to promote responsible gun use through drill
in a "well-regulated militia," the right to arms is no longer valid. Donald L. Beschle,
Reconsidering the Second Amendment: Constitutional Protection for a Right of Security,
9 HAMLINE L. REV. 69 (1986) concludesthat the Amendment guarantees an individual right
of personal security, but the right can be protected by outlawing firearms. Articles
concluding that the Second Amendment confers only a right on states, and not on persons,
are Samuel Fields, Guns, Crime and the Negligent Gun Owner, 10 N. KY. L. REV. 141
(1982); Warren Spannaus, State Firearms Regulation and the Second Amendment, 6
HAMLNE L. REV. 383 (1983); Lawrence Cress, An Armed Community: The Origins and
Meaning of the Right to Bear Arms, 71 J. AM. His. 22 (1983); Keith A. Ehrman &
Dennis A. Henigan, The Second Amendment in the Twentieth Century: Have You Seen
Your Militia Lately? 15 DAYTON L. REV. 5 (1989); Dennis A. Henigan, Arms, Anarchy and
the Second Amendment, 26 VAL. U. L. REv. 107 (1991).
LETHAL LAWS
Although the Bible was less influential in the political theory of the
early American republic than the histories of Great Britain, Greece, and
Rome were, all of the people who shaped the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights (including Deists such as Jefferson and Franklin) knew the Bible
well and took its history lessons seriously. The Book of Esther is set in
the period of the Babylonian captivity and stands as a counterpoint to
Jeremiah, which is set in the period leading up to the conquest of Judea
by Babylon. Babylonian King Ahasuerus, influenced by a malicious
advisor, orders the extermination of all Jews. The King's wife, Queen
Esther, is secretly a Jew and risks her life by telling the King and
convincing him to execute the malicious advisor. Unfortunately, the
King's order to execute and plunder the Jews has already gone out and
cannot legally be rescinded. But the King can send out a second decree,
so he sends a decree telling
the Jews which were in every city to gather themselves together,
and to stand for their life, to destroy and slay, and to cause to
perish, all the power of the people and provinces that would
assault them . . . . Thus the Jews smote all their enemies with
the stroke of the sword . . . . [T]he other Jews that were in the
king's provinces gathered themselves together, and stood for
their lives, and had rest from their enemies, and slew of their
foes seventy and five thousand .... 1
54
Although the authors focus primarily on the physical implications of
gun controls-of genocide victims being deprived of tools which would
facilitate resistance-the classical ideologists of the right to bear arms
would have agreed with them. However, they might have added another
point which they thought even more important: disarmament upsets the
proper relationship between the master (the people) and the servant (the
Forty-three state constitutions include their own right to bear arms provision. See
generally, Robert Dowlut, State Constitutional Rights to Bear Arms: Traditional
Interpretation and Public Housing, 5 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 203 (1992).
One interesting piece of new scholarship argues that an individual right to own
handguns for personal protection can be found in the federal Ninth Amendment. Nicholas
J. Johnson, Beyond the Second Amendment: An Individual Right to Arms Viewed Through
the Ninth Amendment, 24 RuTGERS L.J. 1 (1992).
154. Esther 8:11, 9:5, 9:16 (King James). The King James version was used in
eighteenth-century America. Religious scholars now concur that the Book of Esther is
probably ahistorical, a fact which that does not invalidate its theological significance. 1
IsAAc Asimov, Asimov's GUIDE TO THE BmLE 462 (1968).
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government) by making the people accustomed to dependence on the
government. Machiavelli observed that
[A]mong other ills which ensue from being disarmed is contempt
... . There can be no proper relation between one who is
armed and one who is not; nor is it reasonable to expect that one
who is armed will voluntarily obey one who is not, or that the
latter will feel secure among servants who are armed. 1
55
Joel Barlow observed that
[It] palsies the hand and brutalizes the mind: an habitual disuse
of physical force totally destroys the moral; and men lose at once
the power of protecting themselves, and of discerning the cause
of their oppression.
1 56
To the generation that drafted the Second Amendment, possessing
arms to deter a government (or a mob which might be inspired by the
government) that might contemplate mass murder was an uncontroversial
moral imperative. The fact that the same message in the 20th-century
book Lethal Laws may be considered so radical as to be not even worth
discussing is perhaps one reason why genocide has become the great
pandemic of the twentieth century.
VI. CONCLUSION: TAKING GENOCIDE SERIOUSLY
One of the contributions of Lethal Laws is that it moves the gun
control debate beyond the point where it has been stuck for a very long
time on what might be called the "lone homeowner." Gun rights
advocates have claimed that armed citizens can use guns to defend
themselves against criminals, while gun prohibition advocates have
countered that ordinary people cannot use firearms effectively under stress,
155. NiccoLo MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 54 (Daniel Donno ed. & trans., Bantam Books
1966)
156. JOEL BARLOW, ADVICE TO ThE PRIVILEGED ORDERS IN THE SEVERAL STATES OF EUROPE:
RESULTING FROM THE NECEsSrIY AND PROPRIErY OF A GENERAL REVOLuION IN THE PRINCLE OF
Gov RSENT 45 (London, 1792, 1795 & reprint 1956).
Barlow's viewpoint is shared by Raymond Kessler, a Marxist political scientist who
argues that a disarmed populace is more likely to feel dependent on the government and
therefore is unwilling to question fundamental social issues. See Raymond Kessler, Gun
Control and Political Power, 5 LAw & POL'Y Q. 383 (1983).
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and that the defensive home gun is more likely to be used to kill a loved
one during an argument than to provide any meaningful protection. What
results from the lone homeowner debate is an attempted calculus of net
lives saved-or lost-due to gun control, as one attempts to weigh the self-
defense value of firearms, the ability of gun control laws to disarm
criminals, to factor in whatever extra quantum of suicide is attributable to
the presence of guns in the home, to guess how many gun accident victims
are so reckless that they would likely die in some other accident, and so
forth. 57 Notably, many gun control advocates acknowledge that proposed
controls will have little effect, but they support new restrictions with the
theory "if it saves one life, it's worth it."
This gun control calculus will no doubt continue to interest many
criminologists, but Lethal Laws offers some powerful evidence that the
calculus is of little relevance to the ultimate question of the human cost of
gun control. Let us assume that the entire difference in the homicide rate
between the United States and Europe is due to the absence of sufficiently
stringent American gun laws comparable to the European laws.15 Thus,
if Europe moved to an American-style system of less-restrictive gun
controls, the European homicide rate would immediately rise to American
levels. If we make these assumptions, then we find, as the authors note,
that "with an American-style murder rate it would take 400 years for
Europe's common criminals to murder as many people as the Nazi
government murdered in just 13 years. "159
In other words, over the long run, the risk to life from criminal
governments is overwhelmingly larger than the risk to life from lone
criminals. Gun control measures which substantially reduce the possibility
of resistance to genocide, but which offer little commensurate increase in
lives saved, might thus be considered to endanger rather than enhance
public safety. For example, so-called "assault rifles" are virtually never
used in crime in the United States (they are used in less than one percent
of homicides), but they are the best weapons for civilian resistance to a
genocidal government."6 The authors force us to consider whether the
157. The best quantitative analysis of all of these issues can be found in KLECK, supra
note 117. The book was awarded the Hindelang Prize by the American Society of
Criminology for making the most significant contribution to criminology in a three-year
period.
158. Closer analysis suggests that very little, if any, of the difference between the
American homicide rate and the homicide rate in other democratic nations is due to gun
control laws. See KOPEL, supra note 46.
159. SIMKIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 4.
160. The statistics on "assault weapons" and their utility in insurrection are detailed
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recently-enacted Congressional prohibition on so-called "assault weapons"
may actually be a lethal law. Conversely, laws which do not disarm the
populace and which do not create government-owned lists of gun-
owners-such as laws punishing reckless conduct with a gun which causes
the injury of a child-would seem unobjectionable under the Lethal Laws
thesis.
Even persons who reject the book's thesis will find it helpful in
understanding why many gun owners resist seemingly "reasonable"
controls. America's leading gun prohibition lobby, Handgun Control,
Inc., hypothesizes that those who objected to the "Brady Bill" simply had
a selfish objection to the "inconvenience" of waiting a week to buy a
handgun.' 6' The more fundamental objection, however, was to let the
government take control over the populace's acquisition of firearms was
to put in place precisely the kind of laws which a murderous government
could use to disarm its victims. Whether the fears are considered credible
or not, they are real, and serious advocates of gun control need to address
them.
Another valuable feature of Lethal Laws is that it traces the
connection between gun prohibition and prohibition of alcohol and drugs.
This story should one day merit its own book, but in the meantime, the
authors remind us how parasitic gun control has been on drug and alcohol
control. America's first major gun control law, the National Firearms Act
of 1934, was a direct result of the violence engendered by alcohol
prohibition. 62 The authors might have noted also that current "gun
at length in SImcu ET AL., supra note 2, at 39-48. See also David B. Kopel, Rational
Basis Analysis of "Assault Weapon" Prohibition, 20 J. CONTEMP. LAw 381 (1994).
161. David B. Kopel, Guns-In Whose Hands? (forthcoming manuscript on file with
the author).
162. SIMKIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 25-27.
Even much of the rhetoric is the same. Today's "gun-free zones" are the direct
progeny of "drug-free zones."
The Anti-Saloon League at the beginning of the twentieth century complained that
there were more saloons in the United States than there were schools, libraries, hospitals,
theaters, parks, or churches. Id. at 25. This complaint pre-figures the complaint of the
handgun prohibitionist Violence Policy Center that late-20th-century America has "More
Gun Dealers than Gas Stations."
The "More X than Y" complaints, while accompanied by high moral dudgeon, often
reflect a failure to think through simple economics. A saloon can profitably operate with
a few dozen customers a day, only a few of which may be in a saloon at a given moment.
In contrast, few hospitals can pay their expenses by having only a half-dozen beds
occupied at a given moment. Unlike saloons (which need only chairs, tables, a bar, and
a supply of alcohol), hospitals generally require large investments in capital assets-again
making the existence of a few large hospitals much more viable than numerous small
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control" efforts are partly a response to the violence that has resulted from
the "drug war," and partly a reflection of the drug war's message that the
government should prevent adults from possessing objects, such as
semiautomatic rifles or marijuana, whose possession offends the
sensibilities of the majority of the population.
But by far the most important accomplishment of Lethal Laws is that
it forces us to think seriously about genocide-forcing us to do more than
simply deplore mass murder by the government, and to start thinking
about how to end such murders.
The rhetoric of the "public health" campaign against gun ownership
labels gun violence a "disease" and guns a "disease vector."1 63  But if
malicious human acts are to be classified as a disease, then as Lethal Laws
observes, "[g]enocide is among humankind's deadliest 'diseases.' ""6
It is important to note the crisis situation that the world has come to
regarding genocide. Since World War II, more people have been killed
in state-sponsored genocide than have been killed by war. 65 Genocide is
more common in the twentieth century than in any century. As this
Article was written, genocide was in progress in Rwandat 66 and Bosnia,
and the world community had done nothing effective to stop the genocide
in either nation. (Although discovered by the authors too late for inclusion
in Lethal Laws, the gun control laws in both Rwanda and the former
hospitals. So it should not be surprising that there are fewer hospitals than saloons and
that most hospitals are much larger than most saloons.
Similarly, until the Clinton administration's recent "crack-down," it was possible for
a person to operate a firearms business as a second business from the home, selling a few
dozen guns a year to friends by working an evening or two a week. In contrast, gasoline
dealers cannot operate profitably without staying open most daylight hours and attracting
a huge traffic of mostly anonymous customers. Selling firearms from one's home requires
almost no capital investment, whereas operating a gas station requires a significant capital
investment in the station itself, as well as in the (increasingly-expensive) storage tanks and
fuel pumps that must comply with environmental regulations. Again, it should not be
surprising that more small businesspeople can become part-time dealers of firearms than
can become full-time operators of capital intensive gas stations. The fact that America has
more gun dealers than gas stations (and more saloons than hospitals) should surprise only
a person who is ignorant of economics, and who expects that the quantity of any given
item in society should be in proportion to his appraisal of its moral worth.
163. David B. Kopel, Guns, Germs, and Science, 84 1. MED. Assoc. GA. (forthcoming
June 1995).
164. SIMKIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 75.
165. Id. at vi.
166. See Ren6 Lemarchand, The Apocalypse in Rwanda, CULTURAL SURVIVAL Q.,
Summer/Fall 1994, at 29.
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Yugoslavia were similar to gun control laws which have facilitated
genocide in other nations.)
In fact, the authors may significantly underestimate the 20th-century
death count from genocide. Their eight-nation study uses conservative
estimates of genocide in each of the nations to arrive at a total death count
of 56 million. 67  University of Hawaii political science professor R.J.
Rummel has researched the demographic evidence regarding genocides in
much more detail, and he puts the total number of victims of mass
murders by governments during the twentieth century at 169,198,000. If
the deaths of military combatants are included, the death total rises to
203,000,000. Rummel's book, Statistics of Democide: Estimates, Sources,
and Calculations on 20th Century Genocide and Mass Murder, includes
data on mass murders by several regimes not discussed in Lethal Laws.
These regimes (number of deaths in parentheses) include: Nationalist
China (10,076,000 from 1928 to 1949); Japan (5,964,000); Vietnam
(1,678,000); North Korea (1,663,000); Poland (1,585,000 from 1945 to
1948); Pakistan (1,503,000); Mexico (1,417,000 from 1900 to 1920);
Yugoslavia (1,072,000 from 1944 to 1987); and Czarist Russia (1,066,000
from 1900 to 1917).168 There is no evidence that any of these nations
deviated from the pattern described in Lethal Laws: the preference to
murder unarmed victims who were subject to gun controls. 
169
Stated another way, the number of people killed by governments in
the twentieth century is over two-thirds of the current population of the
United States. As a cause of premature death, criminal governments
massively outpace ordinary criminals, as well as most types of disease.
167. SiMXIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 14.
168. R.J. RUMMEL, STATISTICS OF DEMOCIDE: ESTIMATES, SOURCES, AND CALCULATIONS ON
20TH CENTURY GENOCIDE AND MASS MURDER (1994) (this book is a statistical companionto
R.J. RUMMEL, DEATH BY GOVERNMENT, supra note 110.)
169. See SIMKIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 187-228. As with the countries described in
Lethal Laws, the gun controls were generally not instituted by the genocidal regimes;
rather, the laws were in place before the murderous government took office.
Unless Yugoslavia, North Korea, and Vietnam had different gun control policies
from those of every other Communist government whose gun laws have been studied in
the West, these nations would have had strict gun controls. Mexico currently has quite
strict gun laws. ROBERT L. NAY, LAW LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, FIREARMs REGULATIONS IN
VARIOUS FOREIGN COUNTRIES 124-34 (1990). But further research is needed to determine
the state of Mexican gun ownership by civilians in the early twentieth century. Further
research is likewise required regarding gun laws in Pakistan and Czarist Russia. The
victims of the Japanese mass murders were not Japanese, but citizens of other Asian
nations, and the details of gun laws in those nations in the 1930s and 1940s are generally
sketchy (except in China).
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Are we serious about ending the genocide epidemic? If so, then we
must seriously consider what kind of genocide control measures have any
prospect of success. International organizations such as the United
Nations are plainly insufficient. The United Nations has failed to stop the
current genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia. Nor did the United Nations or
any other international body take action even against Idi Anin in Uganda,
since Uganda had no serious strategic protectors, unlike tte Guatemalan
generals, who were U.S. allies, or the Khmer Rouge, who were Chinese
allies. The Ugandan army was powerful only in comparison to the
disarmed Ugandan people; Arnin's army could have been rapidly toppled
by any international force. Amin's mass murder and repression were
well-known as they were occurring. And yet, the world did nothing.
There is no historical evidence to believe that any collection of nations will
ever take action against a genocidal nation for humanitarian reasons.
Hitler, Idi Amin, and the Khmer Rouge provoked international action only
when they attacked other nations. As long as the genocide was an internal
affair, nothing was done. The majority of governments represented at the
United Nations are dictatorships which rule by armed force rather than by
consent.'70 A body dominated by such dictatorships is unlikely to become
a powerful force for human rights.
If international action to interrupt genocide is not a realistic solution,
is post-hoc punishment of genocide perpetrators any better? The Nazi war
crimes trials were an appropriate way to mete out justice.17  But other
than the losers of World War II, none of the 20th-century genocide
perpetrators has been brought to justice. To the contrary, most of them
died in their beds, wealthy and powerful. Pol Pot and Idi Amin even
today live comfortable lives, and Pol Pot continues to plan a return to
power. The deterrent effect of the possibility of prosecution for crimes
against humanity appears to be rather small, or at least not large enough
to have prevented Stalin and Mao from perpetrating genocide not long
after the war crimes trials were completed, or to have prevented later
genocide in Cambodia, Uganda, Guatemala, East Timor, Kurdistan,
Rwanda, and Bosnia. 72 Also living comfortable lives after a career of
170. These nations are almost all contemporary confirmation of James Madison's
observation that a tyranny in which the government is controlled by a dictatorship, "could
not be safe with a numerical and physical force against it, without a standing Army, an
enslaved press, and a disarmed populace." James Madison Autobiography, 2 WM. &
MARY Q. 191, 208 (1945).
171. See JOSEPH E. PERSICO, NUJREMBERG: INFAMY ON TRIAL (1994).
172. Bosnia is the victim of an international arms embargo that has disarmed the
victims but not the aggressors. Thomas L. Friedman, Foreign Affairs; Free Advice, N.
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mass murder are Haile Mengitsu, who deliberately starved rebellious
Ethiopian provinces, and Mohammad Najibullah, who ruled as the Soviet
puppet in Afghanistan while one million Afghanis were killed.' If the
world cannot muster the will to bring small-time tyrants such as Idi Amin
and Pol Pot to justice, it is hard to believe that grander criminals, running
more powerful nations, will have much fear of an international genocide
tribunal.
Persons who support post-hoe punishment of genocide organizers are
advocates of a worthwhile cause, but it will be a long time before
genocide perpetrators are prosecuted with a regularity and certainty that
deters future perpetrators. To the contrary, the history of the 20th century
suggests that most people who perpetrate genocide get away with it. And
notably, government officials who order genocide policies do not usually
expect to be deposed, so they are unlikely to be deterred by the possibility
of prosecution.
Reducing hatred is a worthwhile anti-genocide strategy. Educational
programs may play an important long-term role in reducing the kinds of
hatred that pave the way for genocide. Promoting respect for peoples of
all races and religions should be a key objective of every educational
system in the world.' 74 But as the authors point out, hatred has been part
of the human condition as long as there have been humans. Unless we
believe that human nature can be fundamentally reformed, then hatred is
going to persist in some form, and as long as there is hatred, there will be
inclinations for genocide.
The authors give us a formula for three key preconditions of
genocide: hatred, government, and gun control. Without any of these
three elements, genocide is not possible. Obviously, not all countries
which have all three elements also have genocide, but every country which
has genocide has all three elements. The authors assume too readily that
the second key precondition for genocide-government-is inevitable. To
the contrary, as Bruce L. Benson argues persuasively in his book, The
Enterprise of Law, it is possible to have law, peace, and civility without
having government.' And it is not impossible that coming decades may
see a major trend towards "panarchy"-that is, governments which have
Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1995, at A23.
173. Ken Adelman, Trials to Rekindle International Justice, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 6,
1994, at A19.
174. Teaching tolerance does not, however, have to be synonymous with indoctrinating
political correctness.
175. See BRuCE L. BENSON, THE ENTERPRISE OF LAW: JuSTICE WrroHur THE STATE (1990);
cf. PIERRE CLAUSTRES, SoCiETY AGAINST THE STATE (1987).
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power over only small communities and which enjoy the true consent of
the governed, since the governed are free to move anywhere else, or to
choose a new government. The break-up of the Soviet Union may perhaps
be a beginning of a trend in this direction. But while a world without
government may make for interesting speculation among futurologists,
such a world is not our current one, nor is it likely to be for several
decades, if ever.
Reducing the power of government, however, is a far more plausible
goal. The authors note the increasing surveillance powers that the United
States government has achieved in recent years, often as a result of the
"drug war." In Nazi-occupied Europe, some Jewish children were
sheltered by Gentile families, who successfully claimed the children as
their own. Greater governmental ability to verify and track the identity of
persons from cradle to grave obviously makes it much harder for genocide
targets to slip through the cracks. Thus, when greater government identity
controls are proposed for the purposes of tax compliance, control of illegal
immigration, health care, drug law enforcement, or gun law enforcement,
we should consider rather seriously whether we really want the
government to always be able to know someone's identity.' 76
The problem of restricting government power is that people are most
likely to actually be able to reduce the powers of governments which abide
by popular control and the rule of law. These governments are the very
governments least likely to perpetrate genocide. Should the law-abiding
government with reduced powers be one day replaced by a different
government, attempting to control the new government is likely to be
much more difficult.
A democratic system of government and a free press can also help
prevent genocide. But these protections are not always sufficient. Hitler
came to power legally, after winning a democratic election. And even
democratic governments can be overthrown by violent coups or by war.
That is how most genocidal governments in this century have come to
power. In short, there are a number of viable anti-genocide strategies, all
of which may do some good, and all of which should be tried. But none
of them, or all of them together, may be sufficient.
And so we are left with the prescription of Lethal Laws and its focus
on the third element of the genocide triad: the unarmed victim. If all
potential genocide victims (i.e. everyone) have a gun (ideally a semi-
176. As a starting point, I would favor immediate repeal of the requirement that
children be issued social security numbers in order to be claimed as tax deductions.
INrERNAL REVENUE SERvIcE, PUBICATION 501: EXEMPTIoNS, STANDARD DEDUCiON, AND FRNG
INFORMATION 17 (1994).
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automatic rifle), then genocide becomes much more difficult. As Lethal
Laws demonstrates, governments will not attempt genocide until they have
first disarmed the victims. Victims cannot be disarmed against their will.
If potential victims are willing to draw a line in the sand, then they can,
at the least, inflict casualties on government forces before the surviving
soldiers or policemen "take my gun from cold dead fingers." 1 7 Genocide
is pre-eminently the work of bullies, and if bullies take a large risk of
being shot, then many bullies are apt to desist. Moreover, the very
presence of an armed populace is likely to deter any attempt at genocide
in the first place; at least that is the theory which animated the founders
of the American republic, and it is a theory which Lethal Laws suggests
will have continued viability in the twentieth century.
No one can tell whether Jeremiah or Esther will provide the best
guidance for a future situation. But it is undeniable that the twentieth
century has been a century of pandemic genocide. Governments have
never been more murderous than in this century. Something needs to
change if the twenty-first century is not going to be as lethal as the
twentieth. The Nazi and Soviet regimes which perpetrated two of the
leading mass murders of the century are gone now, but anti-Semitic
fascism is currently a powerful political force in Russia. And the current
Chinese government is the successor to the one that killed so many people
during the cultural revolution. Most of the Third World continues to be
ruled by the same kinds of tyrants who have perpetrated the Third World
genocides of the last several decades. We need to recognize that the
authors have advanced an anti-genocide theory which looks considerably
stronger and more realistic than any competing anti-genocide scheme.
While Lethal Laws focuses on gun ownership as a deterrent to
genocide, the authors also have an opinion about the relationship between
a disarmed populace and other human rights abuses: "Amnesty
International-an organization devoted to ending abuses of human rights
and the freeing of political prisoners-could prevent much of the evil it
denounces, if it promoted unrestricted civilian ownership of military-type
firearms." 78 Not all countries with severe gun controls perpetrate torture
177. "You can have my gun when you take it from my cold, dead fingers" is a
common bumper sticker or t-shirt motto for some gun owners, including the Sheriff of
Graham County, Arizona, who used it as the title of his book defending the right to keep
and bear arms. RICHARD MACK, FROM MY COLD, DEAD FINGERS (1994). Sheriff Mack was
the plaintiff in one of the several lawsuits in which the Brady Act's unfunded mandate that
local law enforcement perform a background check on handgun buyers was declared a
violation of the Tenth Amendment. Mack v. United States, No. CIV 94-113 TCUC JMR
(D. Ariz., June 29, 1994).
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or genocide; but how many governments which perpetrate torture permit
any but the most politically reliable segments of the population to own
guns? If every government which engages in systematic torture has
disarmed its victim population, is there reason to believe that those
governments see a relationship between gun control and the maintenance
of the government's power?
Although Lethal Laws is premised on a political philosophy that would
have seemed quite ordinary to the drafters of the Bill of Rights, in today's
political climate Lethal Laws is a genuinely radical book. But simply
because something is radical does not mean that the legal community (and
the rest of the world) should ignore it-otherwise, Catherine MacKinnon
would not be teaching at the University of Michigan Law School, and
Duncan Kennedy would not have tenure at Harvard.
Indeed, Lethal Laws reminds me in many ways of the books by
MacKinnon's friend Andrea Dworkin. Simkin, Zelman, Rice, and
Dworkin all write with an engaging, passionate style. They do not adopt
an air of academic detachment; the intensity of their belief in their cause
bursts through every word. You will find no more of an attempt to weigh
the benefits of gun control in Lethal Laws than you will find a list of the
ways that patriarchy genuinely benefits women in a Dworkin book. Lethal
Laws, in contrast to the Dworkin books, is meticulously footnoted and
based almost entirely on non-radical source material. Dworkin, Simkin,
Zelman, and Rice all suffer from a tendency to overstate their case and to
villify their opponents. These flaws have not kept Dworkin's basic point
from being acknowledged by the legal academy, nor should the same flaws
keep Simkin, Zelman, and Rice locked outside the academy.
Dworkin advances a thesis (all heterosexual intercourse is rape) that
is radical and novel. Simkin, Zelman, and Rice bring us a thesis that was
once a platitude, but which is now challenging and radical (gun control
facilitates murder by the government). In the legal academy, Dworkin is
accorded a respectful hearing, even by people who ultimately reject her
conclusions. Simkin, Zelman, and Rice are equally entitled to respectful
consideration of their radical thesis. If they do not receive such
consideration, it will be evidence that in today's legal community, radical
feminism is politically correct, but the Second Amendment (and the free-
thought principles of the First Amendment) is not.
Genocide is a human rights violation that dwarves all other crimes.
If we are to be serious-and not merely sanctimonious-about human
Amnesty International USA, a New York attorney named Mark Benenson, now heads the
National Foundation for Firearms Education, a group devoted to protecting Second
Amendment rights.
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rights, then we must be serious about eradicating genocide. Jay Simkin,
Aaron Zelman, and Alan M. Rice have shown that a well-armed
population which is prepared to resist is much less likely to be murdered
by its government than is a disarmed population. If the people of the
world were much better armed, many fewer people would be the victims
of genocide. Unless one can propose a different method of ending
endemic genocide, then the authors' prescriptions stand as the best, and
only, potentially effective medicine. The burden has shifted to the
opponents of firearms rights to either come up with a more effective anti-
genocide medicine or to admit that saving lives was never the primary
objective of the gun prohibition movement in the first place.
